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INTRODUCTION

Under their police power, governments regulate nuisances and take
actions in emergency situations. For protecting humans, animals, and
plants from diseases and other pests (jointly referred to as diseases),
governments order inoculations, quarantine items and people, and seize and
destroy property.' With respect to plants and animals, the United States
Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to prohibit the importation and
movement of items than may be infested. 2 The Secretary also has the
authority to hold, treat, and destroy items to prevent the dissemination of
plant and animal pests. 3 State governments take additional actions to

* The research presented here is based on work supported by the Cooperative State
Research Education and Extension Service (CSREES), US Department of Agriculture
Project No. GEO00684.
** Terence J. Centner is a Professor in the College of Agricultural and Environmental
Sciences at the University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia. His research program involves
the policy analysis of agricultural and environmental issues.
1. See Tyler Denning, Comment, Averting Disaster: A Critical Analysis of
Agrisecurity in the Texas Agricultural Industry, 5 TEX. TECH. J. TEX. ADMIN. L. 255,

269-70 (2004) (noting the costs of slaughtering animals to eliminate a disease when the
government chooses to indemnify producers for destroyed animals); Gian Franco
Gensini, Magdi H. Yacoub & Andrea A. Conti, The Concept of Quarantinein History:

From Plague to SARS, 49 J. INFECTION 257, 257-61 (2004) (discussing quarantine
for preventing the spread of infectious diseases); Andrew H. Nelson, Comment, High
Steaks: Defending North Carolina'sResponse to Contagious Animal Diseases, 83 N.C.

L. REV. 238, 246-55 (2004) (reporting North Carolina's response to mad cow disease);
see also Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Buskirk, 816 F.2d 907, 916 (3d Cir. 1987)
(declining to award compensation for losses accompanying a quarantine of poultry
under an avian influenza eradication program); see generally Alfred J. Sciarrino, The
Grapes of Wrath & the Speckled Monster (Epidemics, Biological Terrorism and the
Early Legal History of Two Major Defenses-Quarantineand Vaccination), 7 MICH ST.

J. MED. & L. 117, 117-76 (2002) (discussing the use of inoculation and quarantine in
warding off contagious diseases).
2. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 391 (cattle), 7711 (plant pests), 7712 (plants), 7714 (pests and
weeds), 8303 (animals) (2006).
3. See Animals and Animal Products, 9 C.F.R. §§ 71.2, 73.1b, 82.14, 92.105,
54.124, 381.73; see generally 9 C.F.R. pts. 91-99, 327, 381, 590 (2011).
Governmental actions to control bovine spongiform encephalopathy, rinderpest, and
H5N1 avian influenza virus show successes in preventing the spread of diseases that
would harm the production of animal food products. Efforts controlling the
Mediterranean fruit fly, boll weevil, and citrus canker have been important in
maintaining food and fiber production in certain areas of the United States. See W.L.
Popham & D.G. Hall, Insect Eradication Programs, 3 ANN. REV. ENTOMOLOGY 335,

335-42 (1958) (discussing the adoption of eradication efforts in the United States); U.S.
Dep't of Agric., Boll Weevil Eradication, APHIS PLANT PROTECTION
QUARANTINE FACTSHEET (March 2007) (discussing boll weevil eradication).

AND
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prevent the introduction and dissemination of diseases, including the
destruction of property. For situations in which the public would be
harmed, a government may declare a disease to be a public nuisance and
take action to remove and destroy property to eradicate all sources.
However, the drastic action of destroying property presents the issue of
whether the government has gone too far and effected an unconstitutional
taking.5 Under the Takings Clause, a governmental action destroying
property requires the payment of compensation for property taken for
public use.6 Recent efforts by the state of Florida to eradicate the citrus
canker disease raised the issue of whether a government can destroy
property in exposure zones to control a disease under its police power or
whether such action effects a compensable taking.7 The Florida legislature
had declared citrus canker a public nuisance, and the state had adopted a
citrus canker eradication program under which trees near a known
infestation were destroyed.8

In Department of Agriculture & Consumer

4. See Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 909 (Cal. 1995)
(observing in an inverse condemnation claim that under an emergency exception,
governments can destroy buildings, diseased animals, rotten fruit, infected trees, and
law enforcement officers can respond to situations that endanger public safety);
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. California, 221 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (finding
that under the state's police power, a state-declared emergency to eliminate the
Mediterranean fruit fly provided immunity for damages to private property); Malbrain
v. Wash. State Dep't of Agric., 86 P.3d 222, 225-26 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004), review
denied, Malbrain v. Wash. State Dep't of Agric. (In re Property at 14255 53rd Ave.),
103 P.3d 201 (2004), U.S. cert. denied, Malbrain v. Wash. State Dep't of Agric., 544
U.S. 977 (2005) (concluding that the destruction of host plants within a certain radius
of an infestation site was an emergency response governed by the law of necessity and
no compensation was due to owners of destroyed property); see United States v.
Russell, 80 U.S. 623, 629 (1871) (noting that an emergency in the time of war justified
the destruction of property but compensation was required).
5. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, (1922) (setting forth the general
rule of takings jurisprudence that property may be regulated, but regulations may go
too far and result in a taking).
6. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010).
7. See Damian C. Adams et al., The Legal Basisfor Regulatory Control ofInvasive
Citrus Pests in Florida:A Review of the Citrus Canker and Spreading Decline Cases,
12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 409, 413 (2007) (discussing the difficulty of setting a boundary
between police power actions and takings); Jonathan Sjostrom, Note, Constitutional
Law - Public Peril andPrivate Property in the Takings Clause - State v. Mid-Florida
Growers, Inc., 505 So. 2d 592 (Fla.2d DCA 1987), 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 569, 584-85
(1987) (analyzing a takings controversy to recommend judicial deference to policepower regulations).
8. See FLA. STAT. § 581.184 (2006).

.1
JOlRNALOF FOOD

194

l.AW &POLICY

I\1o1.7

Services v. Bogorff9 Ms. Bogorff and other homeowners of destroyed
citrus trees initiated a lawsuit for damages claiming the state should pay for
the trees destroyed.' 0 While the state was concerned about the profitability
of its $8 billion citrus industry," the homeowners were furious about
losing citrus trees due to their location in exposure zones.12 The
homeowners claimed that the state had violated the Takings Clause of the
Florida Constitution by destroying their trees without paying for them.'3
In responding to the homeowners' allegation of an unconstitutional
taking, the Bogorff trial and appellate courts refused to recognize that
citrus canker was a public nuisance.1 4 The courts also declined to follow
federal jurisprudence concerning the differentiation of per se and
regulatory takings to determine whether temporary invasions under a
legislative-enacted eradication program constituted a taking.'s Instead, the
appellate court decided that if Florida wanted to eradicate citrus canker, it
should pay for property destroyed.16 The court relied on earlier Florida
cases to find that the destruction of trees in exposure zones during a
temporary invasion of owners' properties was a taking that required
compensation without balancing the equities. 7 The Bogorff appellate

9.

35 So. 3d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review denied, 48 So. 3d 835 (2010).

10.

See id. at 86.

11.

See Tim R. Gottwald et al., The Citrus Canker Epidemic in Florida. The

Scientific Basis of Regulatory Eradication Policy for an Invasive Species, 91
PHYTOPATHOLOGY 30 (2001) (reporting concerns about costs for grapefruit growers
and bans on citrus exports).
12. See, e.g., Peter Whoriskey, FloridiansSue over Loss of Backyard Citrus Trees,
WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2007, at A3 (reporting widespread anger and five lawsuits);
Johnny Diaz, Public Gives Canker Officials an Earful, MIAMI HERALD, July 25, 2001,
at 3B (reporting the anger of tree lovers about the eradication program); Natalie P.
McNeal,Agriculture Chief Feels the Rancor Over Canker, MIAMI POST, May 18, 2001,
at I B (reporting heating objections to the eradication program).
13. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *2 (Fla
Cir. Ct. Feb 21, 2008).
14. See id. at *25, 80; Bogorif 35 So. 3d at 89-90.
15. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *2-23, I1-73; Bogorff, 35
So. 3d at 89-90 (observing that the facts required "no application of multi-part,
recondite tests to decide whether the State regulation has gone too far and must pay just
compensation") (emphasis in original); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433-39 (1982) (differentiating between permanent occupations
and temporary physical invasions).
16. See Bogorff,35 So. 3d at 90.
17. The court cited Graham v. Estuary Properties,Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981)
for the principle that physical invasion or destruction is dispositive of a taking.
Bogorif 35 So.3d at 89-90. With respect to citrus canker, Dep't of Agric. & Consumer
Servs. v. Mid-Fla. Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 1988) required payment for
destroyed healthy trees.
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court's decision that the state should pay for destroyed citrus trees raises a
number of questions about what other governmental actions regulating
disease, prescribing land use activities, precluding nuisances, and
protecting people from dangers might come under scrutiny and require
compensation. Under American jurisprudence, while property owners
have implied obligations not to use property in a manner injurious to the
community,' 8 federal and state constitutions require governments to pay for
property taken for public use.' 9 In efforts to control a disease, should
governments be able to exercise their police power to destroy property
exposed to the disease without compensation or should the government pay
for the property taken? Given recent occurrences of citrus greening, 20 mad
cow disease, 21 avian influenza,22 HIN1 (swine) flu, 23 E. coli, 2 4 and

18. See Saul Jay Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The National Flood
InsuranceProgram and the "Takings" Clause, 17 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 323, 34041 (1990) (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
491-92 (1987) and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887)).
19. See generally John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the
Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1148-56 (2000)
[hereinafter Land Use Law] (arguing that courts have been too favorably disposed to

takings arguments); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for
Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1287-98 (1996) [hereinafter
ColonialLand Use Law] (arguing that governments should be able to regulate without
offending the Takings Clause); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding
of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782-84
(1995) (discussing the history and need for mandating compensation under the Takings
Clause); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 95 (1985) (arguing for a comprehensive approach to takings with the

Takings Clause applying to all modification of liability rules).
20. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR THE
FLORIDA CITRUS INDUSTRY: ADDRESSING CITRUS GREENING, COMMITrEE ON THE
STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR THE FLORIDA CITRUS INDUSTRY: ADDRESSING CITRUS
GREENING DISEASE (HUANGLONGBING) (2010).

21. See Michael B. Abramson, Mad Cow Disease: An Approach to Its Containment,
7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 316, 333-41 (2004) (discussing the response to the
discovery of mad cow disease in the United States); Matthew L. Wald, Mad Cow
Disease in the UnitedStates: The Overview; US. Scours Files to Trace Source of Mad
Cow Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2003, at 1.
22. See Donald Kaye, Avian Influenza Viruses and their Implication for Human
Health, 40 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE 108 (2005) (expressing concerns about avian
influenza infecting humans); Robert Webster and Diane Hulse, Controlling Avian Flu
at the Source, 435 NATURE 415, 415-16 (2005) (discussing approaches to control the
disease without culling all birds).

23.

See David Oshinsky, A Pandemic Waiting in the Wings, WASH. POST, Dec. 6,

2009, at B07 (expressing concerns about outbreaks of deadly flu); L.M. Sixel,

Businesses told to prepare before swine slu strikes, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 20, 2009, at
B3 (advising businesses to prepare for sick employees).
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salmonella enteritidis,25 governments and courts will receive requests for
compensation from persons and businesses that are adversely affected by
actions to control diseases.
Several decades ago, the Supreme Court and state courts addressed
the merits of compensating persons for the loss of property due to
emergencies and diseases.26 Generally, the courts ruled that governmental
efforts controlling disease were legitimate exercises of the police power so
no compensation needed to be paid for destroying property.2 7 However, as
society, legislatures, and courts reconsider this issue, attitudes are
changing. A government's police power is limited and governments may
incur liability when their actions go beyond acceptable governmental
powers. 28 Moreover, in addressing diseases, governments are deciding that
rather than foisting all of the losses on persons damaged by action to
control a disease, compensation might be offered due to the contributions
being made to society. 29

24. See P.J. Huffstutter, Hazelnuts Recalled by L.A.-Based Distributor,L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2011, at AA2 (reporting sickness from E. coli linked to hazelnuts); Lyndsey
Layton, FDA Gives New Scrutiny to Makers of Raw-Milk Cheese, WASH. POST, Feb. 6,
2011, at A6 (reporting the seizure of cheese linked to E. coli to prevent illness).
25. See Lyndsey Layton, Unsafe Eggs Linked to U.S. Failure to Act, WASH. POST,
Dec. 11, 2010, at Al (noting government dysfunction in regulating dangers); William
Neuman, An Iowa Egg Farmer and a History of Salmonella, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2010, at Al (citing slow governmental responses to tainted eggs).
26. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destroying cedar trees to prevent
cedar rust from harming apples); Wallace v. Dohner, 165 N.E. 552, 553-54 (Ind. App.
1929) (approving the destruction of a crop in efforts to eradicate the European corn
borer); La. State Bd. of Agric. & Immigration v. Tanzmann, 73 So. 854, 856-57 (La.
1917) (upholding the destruction of citrus trees to prevent citrus canker from infecting
others); Carsten v. De Sellem, 144 P. 934, 937 (Wash. 1914) (upholding the
destruction of trees to facilitate the eradication of pear blight); Colvill v. Fox, 149 P.
496, 497 (Mont. 1915) (upholding the protection of the horticultural industry from fruit
diseases); Welch v. Nelson, 152 P. 788, 790 (Wyo. 1915) (recognizing the police
power to address plant pests).
27. See id.
28. See Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1957). The State Plant
Board claimed it destroyed healthy trees in an effort to eliminate the burrowing
nematode, but the court found no emergency, so the government had not acted under a
legitimate exercise of its police power. Id.
29. This generally occurs when livestock are destroyed under the Animal Health
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 8306(d) (2006). Compensation is based on the "fair market
value" adjusted for any other compensation received for the event. Id. Compensation
tends to be lower than full market value and often excludes the market value of lost
production, loss of market share, and lost production while facilities are disinfected and
restocked. Robert H. Beach, Christine Poulos & Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, Farm
Economics and Bird Flu, 55 CANAD. J. AGRIC. ECON. 471, 475 (2007).
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This Article examines takings jurisprudence to address the question of
whether the destruction of valuable and allegedly nondiseased property in
exposure zones is a compensable taking. Part One describes the situation
in Florida under which homeowners' trees in exposure zones were
destroyed. After an overview of takings jurisprudence, Part Two analyzes
the decisions by the Bogorff trial and appellate courts. The analysis shows
the courts departing from traditional takings law to conclude that the state
needed to compensate owners losing trees. This sets the stage for
examining the difference between a legitimate exercise of the police power
and a compensable taking, with the Bogorff courts going beyond federal
takings jurisprudence to find the state's action required compensation.
Part Three examines the Bogorff courts' justification for finding the
state's action effected a taking. By examining the judicial responses to the
issues considered in the Bogorff litigation, two opportunities for judicial
discretion are identified for determining whether an action qualifies as a
valid exercise of a government's police power or constitutes a taking. The
examination reveals how activist courts can recast issues, ignore evidence,
and interpret law and evidence to find a taking.3 1 While a review of legal
principles and the evidence suggests the Bogorff courts' finding of a taking
was arbitrary and capricious, an appeal has been unsuccessful so the
district court's ruling constitutes the law of the jurisdiction.31
Part Four takes these issues and highlights how courts in other states
have employed their discretion to go beyond what is required by the federal
Takings Clause in requiring governments to compensate property owners.
Thus, the Bogorff decision may herald a change in the balance between
private property rights and exercises of the police power. Yet, this is
tempered by an examination of social costs that accompany actions to
control a disease. By granting greater compensation to property owners
damaged by disease-control efforts, the decision introduces a moral hazard
problem. With an implicit insurance policy, citrus producers lack
incentives to invest in disease prevention measures. Absent disease
prevention, disease costs will increase, burdening society with diseasemanagement expenses. If courts proceed to rebalance property rights and
the police power, they need to recognize that private property rights exist to
enhance the collective good. When addressing nuisances and controlling
diseases, disregarding established jurisprudence in an overzealous
recognition of private property rights increases governmental costs and
may detract from overall social well-being.

30. For a view that takings clauses were not intended to preclude government
regulation, see Hart, Land Use Law and Hart, ColonialLand Use Law, supra note 19.
31. See supra note 9.
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FLORIDA'S RESPONSE TO ERADICATE CITRUS CANKER

Since 1910, Florida has taken action to prevent the introduction and
dissemination of citrus canker caused by a bacterium that attacks young,
aboveground tissues of citrus plants. 32 Scientific studies report that trees
infected with the disease defoliate, drop their fruit with corresponding
losses in yields, and often have blemished fruit." Bacteria spread to new
trees via wind-driven rain, equipment, and the introduction of infected
plant material such as new trees.3 4 Although fruits from infected trees
remain edible, citrus canker reduces yields and profits.3 ' Fruit from
infected trees may be unmarketable as fresh citrus. 36 The state's decision
to take action in 1995 to eradicate citrus canker was based on two past
successes in eradicating the disease.
Because weighty evidence suggested the establishment of citrus
canker would adversely affect the state's citrus industry, the Florida
legislature declared citrus canker a nuisance. 38 Under this statutory

32. See T.S. Schubert & X. Sun, Bacterial Citrus Canker, Florida Dep't of Agric. &
Consumer Servs., Plant Pathology Cir. No. 377 (5th revision 2003), at 1-2 (citing
rootstock from Japan as the source of citrus canker and the introduction of a quarantine
prohibiting the importation of all citrus plants in 1915). Older and more hardened
leaves and twigs may become more resistant to infection. Id. at 2.
33. See James H. Graham et al., Xanthomonas Axonopodis pv. Citri: Factors
Affecting Successful Eradicationof Citrus Canker, 5 MOLECULAR PLANT PATH. 1, 2
(2004); Schubert & Sun, supra note 32, at 2. Given consumer preference for nonblemished fruit, citrus canker may markedly reduce fresh fruit sales. Tim S. Schubert
et al., Meeting the Challenge of Eradicating Citrus Canker in Florida-Again, 85
PLANT DISEASE 340, 342 fig. 7 (2001) (noting that blemishes reduce fresh fruit
consumption).
34. See C.H. Bock, P.E. Parker & T.R. Gottwald, The Effect of Simulated WindDriven Rain on Duration and Distance of Dispersalof Xanthomonas Axonopodis pv
Citri from Canker Infected Citrus Trees, 89 PLANT DISEASE 71, 71-80 (2005)
(discussing the spread of inocula by wind-driven rain to develop disease-management
strategies).
35. See D. Balasundaram et al., Spectral Reflectance Characteristics of Citrus
Canker and Other Peel Conditions of Grapefruit, 51 POSTHARVEST BiO. & TECH. 220,
220 (2009) (discussing yield reduction); Graham et al., supra note 33, at I (discussing
reduced quality and lower yields).
36. See Gottwald et al., supra note I1, at 31-32.
37. See Schubert et al., supra note 33, at 344-45.
38. See FLA. STAT. § 581.031(6) (2010) (allowing the Department of Agriculture &
Consumer Services to declare a plant pest a nuisance). See generally Graham et al.,
supra note 33, at 12 (noting difficulties in estimating costs but concluding that it was
economical to eradicate the disease); Schubert et al., supra note 33, at 350 (suggesting
that eradication was the preferred response based on cost-benefit ratios, as costs to
manage "endemic [citrus canker] would equal about $25 million for fresh fruit alone,

20111

LEGITIMATE EXERCISES OF THE POLICE POWER OR COMPENSABLE TAKINGS

199

directive, the Florida Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services
(DACS) adopted an eradication program to control this nuisance that
included the destruction of all citrus trees within exposure zones
comprising an area within a stated radius of a known infestation.
Pursuant to this authority, DACS cooperated with the U.S. Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service, which had concluded that the disease
posed a high potential for "damage to commercial and home-grown
citrus." 40
In deciding to eradicate citrus canker, DACS based its action on
scientific evidence, research of experts, and previous successes in
eradicating citrus canker. 41 For citrus canker, infected trees may not be
42
Some
visually apparent until approximately 107 days after infection.
evidence suggests that epiphytic populations of bacteria may live on trees
without infecting the trees but still may spread inocula. 43 Infectious lesions
occur in the upper canopy of trees so it may be difficult to see without
specialized equipment to raise surveyors so they have a view of the tops of

and slightly more than $150 million for the entire citrus crop .. . [excluding] the value
of the markets lost due to quarantines.").
39. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 5B-58.001, 5B-62.003 (2008). DACS also listed
numerous other diseases as nuisances. Id. at r. 5B-62.003(1-26). The 125-foot radius
was adopted in the 1980s as the exposure zone for destroying citrus trees. Haire v. Fla.
Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 778 (Fla. 2004); Fla. Dep't of
Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Pompano Beach, 792 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001). Destruction of citrus plants within a 125-foot radius was upheld as a valid
exercise of the state's police power in Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Polk, 568
So. 2d 35, 40 (Fla. 1990).
40. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CITRUS CANKER ERADICATION PROGRAM,
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, 1 (April 1999) (noting justification for eradicating
citrus
canker)
[hereinafter
USDA
Assessment],
available
at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant health/ea/downloads/ccea.pdf.
41. See Jianwei Qin et al., Detection of Citrus Canker Using Hyperspectral
Reflectance Imaging with Spectral Information Divergence, 93 J. FOOD ENGINEERING
183, 183-84 (2009) (noting the danger of citrus canker to citrus production); Schubert
et al., supra note 33, at 340-50 (delineation a detailed report of the Florida eradication
program including a description of how the disease spreads, the efforts by DACS to
eradicate inoculum sources, and cost justifications for the program).
42. See Tim R. Gottwald, James H. Graham & Tim S. Schubert, Citrus Canker: The
Pathogen and Its Impact, PLANT HEALTH PROGRESS, August 2002, at 6, 15 (reporting
optimal visualization following the spread of inocula by rainstorms with wind),
available
at
http://www.apsnet.org/publications/apsnetfeatures/Pages/CitrusCanker.aspx.
43. See Initial Brief of Appellants, In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) [hereinafter DACSs Initial Brie]. Epiphytic populations are
bacteria surviving independently. Id. at 12.
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the trees.44 If eradication efforts wait until the disease is visible, there is a
high probability that inocula from an infected tree will have already spread
to nearby trees.45 This means that preventive action of destroying trees in
exposure zones is recommended to prevent the disease from spreading.46
Moreover, as the number of infected trees increases, the rate of infection
accelerates. 47
After experience showed that a 125-foot radius exposure zone was
insufficient to stop citrus canker from spreading to healthy trees, scientists
recommended extending the radius to 1900 feet. 4 8 Based on the research
showing it would be economically beneficial to pursue an eradication
program involving exposure zones of 1900 feet, 49 the suggested exposure
zone was adopted by DACS,o and subsequently, by the Florida legislature
in 2002.5I The legislature also provided that noncommercial owners of

44. See Id at 12 (claiming that infected upper canopies occur when inocula are
carried to a tree by wind-blown rain); see also Gottwald et al., Geo-Referenced
Spatiotemporal Analysis of the Urban Citrus Canker Epidemic in Florida," 92
PHYTOPATHOLOGY 361, 376 (2002) (reporting large trees with infestations in their
tops).
45. This was addressed by the legislature in a definition of trees "exposed to

infection." See 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 308. The law was subsequently revised. 2002 Fla.
Laws ch. II (codified as FLA. STAT. § 581.184 (2002)).
46. See Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 779 (Fla.
2004) (noting the scientific study calling for buffer zones); see also Gottwald et al.,
supra note 11, at 32 (discussing the 1900-foot exposure zone).
47. See S. Parnell et al., Optimal Strategiesfor the Eradicationof Asiatic Citrus
Canker in Heterogeneous Host Landscapes, 99 PHYTOPATHOLOGY 1370, 1374 (2009)
(reporting that as the density of host distribution increases, the incidence of disease is
higher).
48. See Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 792 So.
2d 539, 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (reporting that the 125-foot exposure zone was
inadequately reducing the occurrence of citrus canker); Schubert et al., supra note 33,
at 346 (reporting that research supported removal of exposed citrus within a radius of
1900 feet of an infected tree in order to have a 95% chance of eliminating all of the
subsequent infections).
49. See Schubert et al., supra note 33, at 350 (noting that the eradication costs were
justified due to the long run costs of managing infected trees).
50. See Patchen v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 906 So. 2d 1005, 1006
(Fla. 2005) (citing the adoption of the 1900-foot radius); Fla. Dep't of Agric. &
Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 792 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (reporting that a task force recommended the 1900-foot distance to DACS);
Graham et al., supra note 33, at I1 (reporting that experts selected the distance and this
was incorporated into legislation); Gottwald et al. (2001), supra note 11, at 32
(reporting selection of the 1900-foot distance).
51. See 2002 Fla. Laws ch. 11 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 581.184 (2002)). The
adoption of legislation was to strengthen eradication efforts that had been challenged in
the courts. Gottwald, Graham & Schubert, supra note 42, at 23; see also Meszaros v.
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trees destroyed as part of eradication efforts would be compensated at the
rate of $100 per tree, but that was limited to $55 for fiscal year 20022003.52 There was additional support for the eradication of the disease
because of the projected environmental damage from copper bactericides
that would be employed to manage the detrimental effects of the disease.
In conjunction with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's)
citrus canker quarantine program, 54 DACS removed more than 1.56 million
commercial trees and nearly 600,000 trees from noncommercial properties
that were infected or within 1900-foot exposure zones. 5 With respect to

Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 861 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

(reporting the 1900-foot requirement).
52. See FLA. STAT. § 581.1845 (2010) (listing $55 per tree as compensation for
See generally U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL SOUTHEAST REGION AUDIT REPORT, ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH
INSPECTION SERVICE CITRUS CANKER ERADICATION PROGRAM, STATE OF FLORIDA,

residential property owners).

Report No. 33099-2-At, at 8 (August 2002) (reporting a cooperative agreement to
provide $100 to homeowners who lost a citrus tree under the eradication program);
Barry K. Goodwin & Nicholas E. Piggott, Spatiotemporal Modeling of Asian Citrus
Canker Risks: Implicationsfor Insurance and Indemnification FundModels, 91 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 1038, 1039 (2009) (reporting that some residents received vouchers for
$100 to be used for the purchase of replacement trees); Marisa Louise Zansler, The
Economic Impacts to an Industry Associated with an Invasive Species: The Case of
Citrus Canker in Florida (2004) (Ph.D, dissertation, University of Florida) at 28 (noting
$100 vouchers to compensate residential owners for trees destroyed to be used at WalMart for purchasing replacement non-citrus plants).
53. See F. Behlau et al., Effect of Frequence of Copper Applications on Control of
Citrus Canker and the Yield of Young Bearing Sweet Orange Trees, 20 CROP
PROTECTION 300, 301 (2010) (expressing concerns about groundwater contamination
and accumulations of copper in soils); M.M. DEWDNEY & J.H. GRAHAM, FLORIDA
CITRUS PEST MANAGEMENT GUIDE: CITRUS CANKER (University of Florida IFAS
Extension, Nov. 2009), available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/CG040 (calling for
minimizing copper use).
54. See USDA Assessment, supra note 40, at 1-2 (identifying the need for a citrus
canker eradication program); USDA, Citrus Canker: Payments for Commercial Citrus
Tree Replacement, 65 Fed. Reg. 61,077-80 (Oct. 16, 2000) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R.
pt. 301) (amended regulations for providing payments for the destruction of
commercial citrus trees due to citrus canker); USDA, Citrus Canker: Payments for
Recovery of Lost Production Income, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,713-17 (June 18, 2001) (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 301) (establishing a program for paying for lost production
income of commercial citrus growers due to the removal of trees to control citrus
canker); USDA, Citrus Canker: Payments for Commercial Citrus Tree Replacement, 66
Fed. Reg. 43,065-66 (Aug. 17, 2001) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 301) (establishing
a final rule concerning payments to replace commercial citrus trees destroyed in efforts
to eradicate citrus canker).
55. See Gottwald, Graham & Schubert, supra note 42, at 2 (reporting for MiamiDade and Broward counties).
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the Bogorff lawsuit, more than 100,000 noncommercial citrus trees in
Broward County owned by 50,000 homeowners were destroyed.56
However, citrus canker continued to spread. By the mid-2000s, the
increased dispersal of citrus canker by hurricanes and the presence of the
Asian leaf miner altered the merits of the state's eradication efforts.5 ' The
government recognized that the cost estimates of eradication were too low
and USDA decided that the eradication of citrus canker in Florida was
infeasible.58 DACS discontinued eradication efforts in January 2006,59 and
the state's eradication program for citrus canker was repealed,60 and DACS
adopted a program to maintain low inoculum levels that would minimize
the impact of citrus canker on commercial fruit production.'
The repeal of the eradication program did not placate the public furor
of owners whose citrus trees had already been destroyed. The Bogorif
lawsuit was an action in inverse condemnation against the state, requesting
full payment for trees destroyed under the state's citrus canker eradication
program.62

The plaintiffs introduced evidence that their trees within the

1900-foot exposure zones were healthy yet were destroyed.6 1 With this
evidence, the plaintiffs claimed that the state's eradication program set an
opening bid of $55 per tree for the value of a destroyed tree, but if a tree

56. See Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 86-7 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (reporting number of trees and homeowners).
57. See Gottwald, Graham & Schubert, supra note 42, at 16 (noting that the
wounding of citrus foliage by the leaf miner accelerates the spread of citrus canker);
Graham et al., supra note 33, at 4 (observing that the wounds created by the Asian leaf
miner provide a longer period of exposure for bacterial infection by citrus canker);
Michael Ivey et al., Post-HurricaneAnalysis of Citrus Canker Spread and Progress
Towards the Development of a Predictive Model to Estimate Disease Spread Due to
Catastrophic Weather Events, PLANT HEALTH PROGRESS, August 2002, at 3-4,
at
available
http://www.freshfromflorida.com/pi/canker/pubs/Post%20Hurricane%20Analysis%201
-Plant%20Health%20Management.pdf (estimating how hurricanes spread citrus
canker); Parnell et al., supra note 47, at 1375 (acknowledging that hurricanes spread
the disease).
58. See Letter from Chuck Conner to Charles H. Bronson, Florida Comm'r of
Agric., USDA (Jan. 10, 2006), availableat http://www.doacs.state.fl.us/pdf/Canker
%20-%20Bronson.pdf) (reporting on the events leading to discontinuing the
eradication program).
59. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *l l12, 33 (Fla Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
60. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 51-58.001 (2008).
61. See USDA, supra note 58 (announcing the approach of maintaining low
innoculum levels for sustained citrus production in Florida).
3-21.
62. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *37-47,
63. See Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So.3d 84, 88 (Fla Dist.
Ct. App. 2010).
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was worth more, the state must pay the full value of the property taken. 4
The trial and appellate courts agreed with the plaintiffs and ordered the
state to pay more than $11 million.65
The claim in the Bogorff lawsuit alleged a taking in violation of
66
Article X of the Florida Constitution. However, the appellate court cited
several federal cases, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal
takings jurisprudence is insightful. Because federal courts have had more
opportunities to evaluate takings claims, a richer body of jurisprudence
addresses the federal Takings Clause. Therefore, an overview of federal
takings jurisprudence is helpful in establishing a foundation for a
subsequent analysis of Florida law to determine whether the Bogorff court
correctly found there was a taking. 68 Moreover, the analysis helps address
the question of whether other state courts might follow Florida in requiring
compensation to property owners who experience losses from
governmental actions to control or eradicate diseases.
III.

TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

While governments normally acquire property through their power of
eminent domain, in other instances they decline to exercise this power and
their actions result in de facto takings of property through physical
invasions.69 A government may also take action that exceeds its police
power, resulting in a taking of property without just compensation.70
Inverse condemnation actions are used by plaintiffs to obtain just

64. See Id. at 91.
65. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *2, T 1; 53 4; Bogorff, 35
So.3d at 87. The state was allowed setoffs so the damages are less. Id.
66. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
67. See Bogorff, 35 So. 3d at 89. The court cited United States v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) and United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910)
concerning the destruction of property, but declined to examine more recent cases. Id.
at 89. Later, the court cited Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), Webb's Fabulous Pharm. Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155 (1980), and Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Id. at 89-94.
68. However, Florida's Takings Clause is not identical to the federal clause.
69. See Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64, 70 (6th Cir. 1974) (requiring a
physical invasion); Patchen v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 906 So. 2d
1005, 1011 (Fla. 2005) (J. Quince dissenting) (citing inverse condemnation as "a cause
of action to recover the value of property by a property owner against an agency which
has taken private property without a formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain."); Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2008) (defining
a de facto taking as one clothed with eminent-domain power).
70. See Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1957) (finding no emergency
so the government's action was not under its police power).
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In considering
compensation for alleged takings of private property.'
whether a government's action constitutes a regulatory taking, a court
considers whether the government is justified in using its police power or
whether the governmental action goes beyond its power to rise to the level
of a compensable taking.72 For inverse condemnation proceedings alleging
a taking under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, courts rely on the
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: "if

regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 7 3 Subsequent to
this decision, courts have recognized that excessive regulation can
constitute a taking for which the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires payment.7 4 Further inquiry into the impact and
character of the governmental action is needed.
A. Basic Categoriesof Takings

To respond to an allegation of a regulatory taking, the initial inquiry
is whether the property use at issue was one of the rights acquired by the
owner.75
The "bundle of rights" that accompanies the fee simple
ownership of property is limited by the historic common law maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas: "use your own property in such a manner

as not to injure that of another." 7 6 Under this principle, owners have an
implied obligation not to use property in a manner that is injurious to the

71.

See Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson

City, 473 U.S. 172, 196 (1985); Tampa-Hillsborough Cnty. Expressway Auth. v.

A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54, 57-58 (Fla. 1994).
72. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (considering a state law
that took away rights from coal companies on lands close to improved properties
owned by others).
7 3. Id.
74. See Williamson Cnty. Reg'I Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 197. Williamson
also notes the distinction between takings and due process violations. Id. at 197-98.
75. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
321, 326 (2005) (advancing the argument that "background principles serve as an
affirmative defense to takings liability for which the government bears the burden of

proof').
76.

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987);

see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (noting that a
conclusory assertion of not having rights due to associated injury to others is
insufficient); State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 405 (Fla. 1959) (recognizing the
state's police power to destroy private property that was a nuisance). See generally
Patrick C. McGinley, Bundled Rights and Reasonable Expectations: Applying the
Lucas Categorical Taking Rule to Severed Mineral Property Interests, 11 VT. J.
ENVTL.

L. 526, 570-71 (2010) (noting that the Lucas case also imposes this common

law maxim).
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community.
Moreover, in preserving "public weal," states may restrict
the uses individuals can make of their property as part of the burden of
common citizenship. This has been interpreted to enable governments to
preclude the use of property in a manner that is a nuisance, 79 as courts have
concluded that "[t]o destroy property because it is a public nuisance is not
to appropriate it to public use."80 For inverse condemnation claims, a
government may raise background principles of common law property and
nuisance to show that property owners never acquired rights to make
certain uses of properties.8 1
Two types of governmental actions have been categorized by the
Supreme Court as takings that do not require further inquiry. 8 2 The first
type involves the occupation or permanent encroachment by a government
of private land, which is generally defined as a permanent physical
invasion. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court
noted that a minor but permanent physical occupation of property
constituted a taking for which compensation was due. 84 A slightly
different problem is presented by a governmental regulation that deprives
owners of all economically beneficial or productive use of their land. In
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court found that
governmental actions leaving owners with no value in their land were also
77. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491-92 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665
(1887)).
78. See id. at 491 (citing Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5
(1949)).
79. See Reaver v. Martin Theatres of Fla., Inc., 52 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 1951)
(finding a drive-in theater was not a nuisance per se so could not be enjoined); In re
Seligman v. Walkley, 343 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (finding the
destruction of an infested crop was the common-law right of the state to abate a public
nuisance).
80. See State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 405 (Fla. 1959) (citing the
common law maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas); see also Gray v. Thone, 194
N.W. 961, 963 (Iowa 1923) (recognizing that property taken to abate "a nuisance or to
prevent the spreading of a pestilence is not taken for public use.").
81. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (finding that the
government needed to identify background principles of nuisance and property law that
prohibit the owner's intended uses); see also Jones v. Trawick, 75 So. 2d 785, 787 (Fla.
1954) (finding that a property owner did not have a right to develop property as a
cemetery as it was a nuisance that would injure others); McGinley, supra note 76, at
571 (noting that, under Euclidean zoning, a government may limit land to a single use).
82. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1289-90 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (classifying both categories asperse takings).
83. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616-17 (2001) (remanding an
inverse condemnation claim to determine whether there was a regulatory taking);
Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (considering a physical invasion).
84. See 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
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takings.8 ' The Lucas decision identified a "categorical rule that total
regulatory takings must be compensated." 86
But categorical takings prescribed by the Lucas court do not include
situations in which a government precludes nuisance activities, precludes
actions that would injure others, or destroys property in emergency
situations. 8 7 Although the court found that the state of South Carolina had
taken the plaintiffs property, the court cited two examples of state actions
that would not effect a categorical taking: state action to prevent an activity
that would flood neighbors' properties and directing the removal of a
nuclear power plant that was astride an earthquake fault."
Such regulatory action may well have the effect of
eliminating the land's only economically productive use,
but it does not proscribe a productive use that was
previously permissible under relevant property and
nuisance principles. The use of these properties for what
are now expressly prohibited purposes was always
unlawful, and (subject to other constitutional limitations) it
was open to the State at any point to make the implication
of those background principles of nuisance and property
law explicit. 89
Lucas suggests that if longstanding general common law principles of
public nuisance limit property owners' rights concerning the use of their
properties, a state regulation confirming these limitations is not a taking. 90
Thus, it may be found that state restrictions on property rights based on

85. See 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
86. Idat 1026.
87. See id at 1029 n. 16 (noting that states may duplicate results that could be
achieved under private nuisance law and may destroy real and personal property in
cases of actual necessity to prevent the spreading of fire or to forestall other grave
threats to property).
88. See id at 1029.
89. Id. at 1029-30.
90. See id at 1030 (observing "that the Takings Clause does not require
compensation when an owner is barred from putting land to a use that is proscribed by
those 'existing rules or understandings' is surely unexceptional."). See generally
Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the
Roots of the Takings "Muddle ", 90 MINN. L. REv. 826, 837 (2006) (finding that Lucas
does not totally preclude state restrictions on property rights); James L. Huffman,
BackgroundPrinciples and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years after Lucas," 35 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1, 3, 5-6 (2008) (noting that because property rights are defined by common law
nuisance a state's action that does not go beyond its police power to abate nuisances is
not a taking).
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background principles of property and nuisance law are permitted.9' State
restrictions that do not go beyond common law nuisance or property law
are not takings. 92
Lower courts, but not the Supreme Court, have called both
"permanent physical invasions" and "the deprivation of all value" as per se
takings. 93

Commentators also call both categories per se takings 94 or

categorical takings.9 5 However, in the absence of such a definition by the

91. See Karkkainen, supra note 90, at 837 (questioning the Lucas decision to
recognize background principles of property law and nuisance)
92. See Huffman, supra note 90, at 3 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Carolina Coastal Counsil,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
93. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1289-90 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, No. 00-2449, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22348,
at 21 (1st Cir. 2001); Dist. Intown Properties Ltd. v. Dist. Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 879
(D.C. Cir. 1999); Wash. Legal Fdn. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice, Fdn., 106 F.3d
640, 645 (5th Cir. 1997); Texas Manu. Housing Ass'n v. Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095,
1105 n.11 (5th Cir. 1996); 767 Third Ave. Assoc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1583
(Fed. Cir. 1995). A Florida court has labeled per se and total deprivations as facial
takings. Shands v. City of Marathon, 999 So. 2d 718, 722 n. 8 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008).
94. See Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'
Jurisprudence: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 691 (1996) (asserting Lucas established a per
se takings category); McGinley, supra note 76, at 535 (saying that Lucas posited aper
se taking rule); Steven J. Eagle, Planning Moratoria and Regulatory Takings: The
Supreme Court's Fairness Mandate Benefits Landowners, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 429,
473 (2004) (saying a complete deprivation of value is a per se taking); Oliver C.
Houck, More Unfinished Stories: Lucas, Atlanta Coalition,and Palila/Sweet Home, 75
U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 355 (saying that a per se taking includes situations where
property has lost its economic value); Mark E. Sabath, Note, The Perils of the Property
Rights Initiative: Taking Stock of Nevada County's Measure D, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 249, 251, (2004) (declaring "a 100% diminution in property value is a 'per se
taking"'); Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property:
Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 327 (2006)
(claiming Lucas defined "total deprivation of economic value as a per se taking");
Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation between Ends and Means in
American Property Law, 94 CORN. L. REV. 959, 979 (questioning "whether or not total
deprivations of economic value should be per se takings").
95. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 75, at 324 (noting that categorical takings had
previously been limited to permanent physical occupations); Carole Necole Brown,
Taking the Takings Claim: A Policy and Economic Analysis of the Survival of Takings
Claims after Property Transfers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 7, 17 n.56 (2003) (saying that
pursuant to Loretto, permanent physical occupations are categorical takings); Huffman,
supra note 92, at 2-3 (using the term categorical takings for physical invasions and the
Lucas categorical taking ); McGinley, supra note 76, at 526 (saying that Lucas
established a second categorical rule).
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Supreme Court, per se physical invasions and categorical deprivations of
value remain distinct. 9 6
Regulatory takings, a third category, involve governmental actions
that go so far in compromising the rights of property owners that they "are
functionally equivalent to the classic taking." 9 7 Regulatory takings are
governmental actions that go "too far." 98 Courts have defined "too far" as
"the point at which regulation becomes so onerous that it has the same
effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain or
physical possession." 99 Regulatory takings are governed by standards set
forth by the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City. 0 0 Determining whether a government action is a regulatory
taking requires an ad hoc inquiry of the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action.' 0 ' Under the Penn Central standards, a government
must pay owners whenever its action too severely denigrates private
property interests. 102
Moreover, governmental action that singles out individuals or classes
of property for harsher treatment suggests a taking. 0 3 This intimation
comes from the Supreme Court's decision in Armstrong v. United States in
96. See F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing
Under the Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central TransportationCompany,
14 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 121, 126-28 (differentiating per se takings from the
total takings categorical rule).
97. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010) (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539); see
also Robert G. Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from
Takings Doctrine, 30 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 371, 402-03 (2006) (noting that claimants
of an inverse condemnation claim "must expect to have to demonstrate the economic
burdens on their property that are so severe that they are the functional equivalent of
physical dispossession.").
98. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537-38 (2005); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); Williamson Cnty. Reg'1 Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 199 (1985).
99. Williamson Cnty. Reg'/ PlanningComm'n, 473 U.S. at 199.
100. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
101. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39; Macdonald, Sommer& Frates v. Cnty. of Yolo,
477 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1986).
102. See, e.g., Mann v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 743 (Ga. 2007)
(observing that the appellant's property interest was so severely restricted that it
amounted to an unconstitutional taking); 614 Co. v. Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency,
547 N.W.2d 400, 407-08 (Minn. 1996) (finding appellant's ability to raise financing to
be severely inhibited so there was a cause of action for a taking).
103. See Karkkainen, supra note 90, at 909 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40,49 (1960)).
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which it stated that "some people alone [should not] . . . bear public

burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole."3 '" The Court reaffirmed this principle in Lingle v. Chevron USA,
Inc., but noted that governments can interfere with property rights for the
public good. 1os Thus, the Supreme Court recognizes that property can be
regulated to a certain extent, with the issue of whether a government went
too far being determined by the factors enunciated in Penn Central.t os
Numerous inverse condemnation claims concerning a broad range of
zoning and land use regulations,' 07 health and safety ordinances, 0 8 and
nuisance regulations' 09 have presented courts with opportunities to clarify
the meaning of the Constitution's Takings Clause.
B. DistinguishingTakingsfrom Due Process

In addressing claimants' arguments of unconstitutional takings, courts
consider whether property owners should be able to secure compensation

104. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 483 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987) (agreeing with

Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 40).
105. See 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005) (acknowledging that "government regulationby definition- involves the adjustment of rights for the public good," citing Andrus v.

Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)).
106. See, e.g., Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25981, at 3738 (9th Cir. 2010).
107. See Williamson Cnty. Reg'1 Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 175 (1985) (alleging the application of zoning laws and regulations
amounted to a taking); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611 (2001) (contesting
the application of wetlands regulations as takings); City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 698 (1999) (considering a refusal to allow plaintiffs to develop
property).
108. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277-81 (1928) (finding that red cedar trees
infected with cedar rust located within a certain radius of an apple orchard were a
public nuisance and could be destroyed without compensating owners); Loftin v.
United States, 6 Ct. Cl. 596, 612 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1984) (noting that the state could destroy
cattle infected with tuberculosis without compensation under its police power to abate a
public nuisance); State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 404-05 (Fla. 1959)
(concerning takings and due process claims under a citrus disease control program);
Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 778-79 (Fla. 2004)
(considering a challenge to a citrus canker eradication program); In re Seligman v.
Walkley, 341 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (finding the destruction of
infested potato crop was a public nuisance so no compensation was owed).
109. See, e.g., Davet v. Cleveland, 456 F.3d 549, 553 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming an
administrative determination that a condemned building was a public nuisance so that
the city could demolish it without compensating the owner).
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for interferences with property rights."o For takings challenges involving
regulatory actions, the guarantee of compensation for property embodied in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments applies to regulations that were not
As the Supreme Court
part of the government's police power."'
commented in Mugler v. Kansas:

A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes
that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any
just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of
property for the public benefit.. .. The power which the
states have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their
property, as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or
the safety of the public, is not, and, consistently with the
existence and safety of organized society, cannot be,
burdened with the condition that the state must compensate
such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may
sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a
noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the
community. The exercise of the police power by the
destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance, or
the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its
value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking
property for public use, or from depriving a person of his
property without due process of law. In the one case, a
nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property
is taken away from an innocent owner.112
Following this interpretation, courts review regulations employing a due
process analysis to determine whether they protect health, safety, or
welfare." 3 Regulations that prevent injuries in the community are within
the police power so they do not violate the Due Process Clause." 4

110. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 483 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (finding that takings jurisprudence is not to limit
governmental interference but rather to pay when the interference amounts to a taking).
I 11. See Dreher,supra note 97, at 373-74.
112. 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
113. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (finding that
restrictions under a zoning ordinance did not deprive a property owner of due process
of law).
114. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 666 (1887); see also Brauneis, supra note
94, at 628 (discussing due process cases).
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To determine whether a government's regulation adversely affects
property rights, the Mugler Court observed that if a right does not inhere in
citizenship, governmental legislation to promote the common good does
not impair or interfere with any constitutional property rights. "'
The principle that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, was
embodied, in substance, in the constitutions of nearly all, if
not all, of the States at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and it has never been regarded as
incompatible with the principle, equally vital, because
essential to the peace and safety of society, that all
property in this country is held under the implied
obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious
to the community.116
With this precedent, later courts upheld health and safety statutes as
well as land use regulations as legitimate exercises of the police power
without regard to the financial detriment they imposed on property
owners. 117 Under the legitimate exercise of its police power, a government
could prohibit land uses for the public good and property owners did not
need to be compensated.
The nearly unbridled use of the police power was changed by the
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon in which the Court
examined Pennsylvania's Kohler Act to determine whether it was a valid
exercise of the police power."' The Act precluded coal companies from
mining anthracite coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of
structures used as dwellings for humans. 11 9 In responding to the coal
company's challenge, the Supreme Court acknowledged that private rights
must yield to governments' police power so that governments can function.
Yet, governmental limitations on property rights are limited; otherwise,
"the contract and due process clauses are gone."1 2 0 Police power

115.

See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 662-63.

116. Id. at 665 (citations omitted).
117. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (banning the use of property
as a brickyard); Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (declaring zoning constitutional); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (allowing the destruction of healthy cedar trees to
protect apple production). See generally Dreher, supra note 97, at 375 (discussing the
judicial examination of the history of regulations as a due process issue).
118. See 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
119. See id. at 412-13.
120. Id. at 413; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 473 (1987) (citing Mahon, 260 U.S. at 393).
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regulations that diminish private property values beyond a certain
magnitude are exercises of eminent domain and governments must pay for
property taken.121 While "[t]he greatest weight is given to the judgment of
the legislature," aggrieved parties are able to contend that their diminished
property values are so great that the regulation is unconstitutional.122 With
this foundation, the Mahon Court proceeded to determine whether the
Kohler Act could be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power. 12In
deciding that the Act could not be sustained, the Court noted that while
governments can regulate property, "if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." 24
Subsequent cases did not immediately adhere to the suggested
analysis of looking at the magnitude of the loss to determine the
constitutionality of a regulation.125 Rather, significant land use regulation
cases continued to be analyzed under a categorical due process analysis.1 26
In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,1 2 7 the Court upheld municipal zoning
provisions that averredly destroyed a great part of the owner's value. 281In

Miller v. Schoene,129 the Court upheld a state statute that authorized the
destruction of cedar trees without compensation to prevent the spread of a
disease that harmed apple production.1 30 Under these due process analyses,
the courts never addressed the issue of whether takings jurisprudence
precludes governments from enacting regulations to protect the public from
harm without compensating adversely affected property owners.
Furthermore, Mahon did not answer the question "whether a
regulation that 'goes too far' exceeds the government's police power, and

121.
122.

See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
Id.

123. Seeld at 414.
124. Id. at 415.
125. See Dreher, supra note 97, at 377 (observing that the case was cited infrequently
over the next 40 years).
126. See id. at 377-78 (noting that Mahon was seen as a Due Process and Contracts
Clause case rather than a takings case, citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926), Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), and Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928) as showing a continued analysis of land use regulations under a
due process analysis).
127. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
128. See id. at 384, 397 (declaring a zoning ordinance to be a valid exercise of
authority so there was no due process violation).
129. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
130. See id. at 277 (allowing the destruction of healthy cedar trees to protect apple
production).
131. See Dreher, supra note 97, at 378 (noting that the Court also failed to provide a
definitive answer to the question of "whether the proper remedy for a regulatory taking
is payment of just compensation, rather than invalidation of the offending ordinance").
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is thus a violation of the Due Process Clause, or whether it instead effects
an actual taking of the owner's property for which just compensation must
be provided under the Takings Clause."' 32 Succeeding cases developed
takings jurisprudence so that land use regulations effected a taking if they
did not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denied owners
By employing a
economically viable uses of their properties.13 3
"substantially advances" formula set forth by the Supreme Court in Agins
v. City of Tiburon,' 34 the earlier due process analysis was incorporated into
a takings analysis. 3 1
This blurring of due process and takings arguments was disapproved
in Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc.,13 6 where the Supreme Court found that the
"substantially advances" formula of Agins was not germane to identifying
regulatory takings. 137
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.. . provides
that private property shall not "be taken for public use,
without just compensation." As its text makes plain, the
Takings Clause "does not prohibit the taking of private
property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of
that power." In other words, it "is designed not to limit the
governmental interference with property rights per se, but
rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise
proper interference amounting to a taking."
With this description of the Takings Clause, the Lingle Court proceeded to
find that the Agins "substantially advances" formula prescribes an inquiry
in the nature of a due process test.

132. See id. at 379 (identifying an ambiguity in the conclusion reached by the Mahon
court).
133. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 334 (2002); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 700 (1999);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485, 496 (1987).
134. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
135. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (reciting that "there
[was] no question that the 'substantially advances' formula was derived from due
process, not takings, precedents.").
136. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).

137. See id. at 545.
138. Id. at 536-37 (citations omitted).
139. See id. at 540. See generally Mann v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 745
(Ga. 2007); Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn.
2007); West Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C. v. City of West Linn, 240 P.3d 29, 40-41 (Or.
2010).
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The Lingle Court observed that the "substantially advances" formula
has logic in addressing challenges under the Due Process Clause.140 A
regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be
arbitrary and irrational in violation of a person's due process rights. 141
Drawing upon precedent, the Court recognized that the Due Process Clause
accords persons a remedy against regulations lacking a reasonable
justification of a legitimate governmental objective.14 2 In contrast, a
"substantially advances" inquiry does not address the Takings Clause since
it "reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden" of a
regulation.14 3 Moreover, a "substantially advances" inquiry does not
address the distribution of the regulatory burden among property owners.14 4
"In consequence, this test does not help identify those regulations whose
effects are functionally comparable to government appropriation or
invasion of private property." 45
With the Lingle Court's clarification of the inquiry to be used for
evaluating regulatory taking claims, lower courts need to differentiate due
process and takings claims. When considering a takings claim, courts can
no longer look at the merits of the governmental action 46 or ask whether
the means chosen by government advance the ends.147 Nor may courts ask
whether the regulation chosen is effective in curing the alleged ill.1 4 8
Rather, these relevant concerns are confined to a substantive due process
inquiry. 149 Challenges based on a takings claim will consider the actual

140. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
141. See id.
142. See id. (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)).
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
146. See Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 505 F.3d 860,
870 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the Lingle differentiation of takings claims and due process
violations); Vanek v. State of Alaska Bd. Of Fisheries, 193 P.3d 283, (Alaska 2008)
(noting that a takings analysis is not the same as due process analysis); Wensmann
Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn. 2007) (noting that the
character of takings inquiry involves the nature rather than merit of the governmental
action).
147. See Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (citing Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)).
148. See id; see, e.g., Daihl v. Cnty. Bd. of Appeals of Baltimore Cnty., 265 A.2d
227, 230-3 1 (Md. 1970) (observing in a request for a rezoning that hindsight might
support a different zoning but cannot substantiate error in the zoning adopted by the
city council).
149. See Rose Acre Farms, 559 F.3d at 1278.
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burden on property rights imposed by the regulation at issue.150 Courts
look at the magnitude and character of the burden to determine whether it
is "functionally comparable to government appropriation or invasion of
private property."151 If the burdens are too great, there is a taking.15 2 If the
burdens are placed on a few and not spread among taxpayers, this supports
a conclusion that the regulation effects a taking.153
By separating due process issues concerning the validity of
governmental actions from the issue of just compensation, Lingle curtails
the issues that are evaluated as takings.' 5 4 Issues concerning the legitimacy
of a government's action are not part of a takings challenge but rather are
to be examined under a due process inquiry.' 5 5 Courts have followed
Lingle's distinction between takings and due process.1 56 Takings claims
under the Fifth Amendment do not bar substantive due process claims and
the absence of a taking does not preclude a successful due process claim. s5

150. See id.; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (identifying the magnitude and
character of the burden as being important for takings claims).
151. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542; see also Kafka v. Montana Dep't of Fish, Wildlife
& Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 32 (Mont. 2008), cert. denied, Wallace v. Montana, 130 S. Ct.
394 (2009) (finding no compensable taking for actions precluding charging fees for
shooting game).

152. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
153.

See Mann v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 745 (Ga. 2007) (finding

Georgia's sex offender law to be unconstitutional to the extent that it precludes
offenders from living in their houses that are within 1000 feet of areas where minors
congregate); Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn.
2007) (suggesting that the allocation of the burdens on few property owners may be a
taking).
154. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
155. In Lingle, the Court said that "[a]lthough a number of our takings precedents
have recited the 'substantially advances' formula minted in Agins, . . . [w]e conclude
that this formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test,
and that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence." Id.
156. See Mann v. Calumet City, Ill., 588 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2009) (observing
that the plaintiffs advanced a due process claim rather than a taking); Action
Aptartment Ass'n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir.
2007) (observing that the Fifth Amendment did not preempt the substantive due
process allegation).
157. See Crown Point Dev. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855-57 (9th Cir.
2007) (observing that the denial of a permit to develop a subdivision did not foreclose

the plaintiff's due process theory).
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C. Temporary Invasions May Not Be Compensable Takings

In the Bogorfif lawsuit, both the trial and appellate courts found that
DACS's actions in destroying trees constituted a compensable taking.' 58
The trial court addressed plaintiffs' claim as one of common law inverse
condemnation, and then responded to the issue of whether there was a
taking under the Florida Constitution.1 59 Inverse condemnation is an
eminent domain proceeding brought by property owners instead of the
government.160 In Florida, "inverse condemnation actions are governed by
the same rules that apply to eminent domain proceedings."'61 If the state
confiscates private property for public use under its power of eminent
domain or regulates private property to "effectively deprive[] the owner of
the economically viable use of that property," it must pay the property
owner.162
The Bogorff trial court opined that a physical invasion accompanied
by the destruction of citrus trees was a taking without distinguishing
between physical occupations and temporary invasions.1 63 The appellate
court found that the destruction of plaintiffs' citrus trees, which involved a
physical invasion with the destruction of property, was a taking.16 4 Yet,
not every invasion and not every action resulting in the destruction of

158. See Dept. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010).
159. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *2, I
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
160. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980) (distinguishing
inverse condemnation from eminent domain to call it "a shorthand description of the
manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property
when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted."); Rubano v. Dep't of
Transp., 656 So. 2d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 1995) (noting that when a government "has
effectively taken private property without a formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain, a cause of action for inverse condemnation will lie."); Fla. Dep't of Envtl.
Protection v. West, 21 So. 3d 96, 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) ("[w]here no formal
exercise of eminent domain power is undertaken, a property owner may file an inverse
condemnation claim to recover the value of property that has been defacto taken.").
161. See Dep't of Transp. v. Jirik, 498 So. 2d 1253, 1255 n.2 (Fla. 1986) (considering
whether the elimination of direct access to real property amounts to a taking).
162. See Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 623-24 (Fla. 1990)
(concerning the state's recordation of a map reserving property for storm water
drainage thereby precluding the issuance of development permits).
163. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *2-23,
1-73 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008) (addressing the physical destruction of property
valued at more than what property owners were paid to find a taking without analyzing
the character of the action).
164. Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 90 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2010).
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private property effects a compensable taking. Because the destruction of

trees was pursuant to a legislatively-adopted eradication program, the court
needed to examine the magnitude and character of the burden.165 The
court's finding that DACS invaded plaintiffs' properties and destroyed
trees does not answer the question whether the actions were a compensable
taking.
Since the 1982 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.

decision,166 the Supreme Court has distinguished between types of
67
invasions in determining whether governmental actions effect a taking.'
The issue involves the character of the invasion.168 Courts differentiate
temporary invasions from permanent physical occupations due to
distinctions in the property rights involved. The right to exclude others
from property is a fundamental property right.169 A permanent occupation
of property, however small, severely interferes with the owner's right to
exclude others and is therefore deemed a per se taking requiring
compensation.1 70 For temporary physical invasions, however, ownership
rights are denigrated but property owners retain their right to exclude
others so the burden imposed is not as severe.171 Temporary physical
invasions may not constitute per se takings and may not effect a taking if
In other situations, invasions by
they are transient in nature.1 72
governments are trespasses rather than takings. 7 3

165. See, e.g., Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
166. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
167. See id. at 421; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002).
168. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)
(noting that the right to exclude is one of the most essential sticks in a property owner's
bundle of rights).
169. See id. (identifying an owner's right to exclude as the most fundamental of all
property interests).
170. See id. at 430; Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 959 (7th Cir.
2004) (noting that small invasions can support a claim in inverse condemnation).
171. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434; Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d
1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (differentiating temporary physical invasions from
permanent occupations).
172. See Boise Cascade Corp., 296 F.3d at 1357 (finding that transient intrusions by
federal officials did not effect a taking).
173. See id. at 1355 (noting that governmental intrusions not permanently usurping
an owner's exclusive right to possess, use, and dispose of property is in the nature of a
trespass); Jones v. Phila. Police Dep't, 57 Fed. Appx. 939, 942 (3d Cir. 2003)
(addressing an intrusion by the police).
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A number of courts have had opportunities to consider temporary
physical invasions that destroy property.' 74 Four situations can be
described where a government physically entered private property, or
caused the entry of a substance, and damaged valuable property interests
yet did not effect a compensable taking. The first two situations involve
governmental actions to address plant pests. The third category comprises
actions removing dangerous physical structures while the fourth involves
the entry of floodwaters. Under each of these situations, DACS's actions
are evaluated to discern whether the facts show a compensable physical
taking.
1. Destroying Plants to Eradicate a Beetle
An analogous factual situation to Florida's citrus canker eradication
program was Washington State's action to eradicate the citrus longhorned
beetle, as reported in Malbrain v. Washington State Department of
Agriculture.175 Based on the recommendations of a state scientific
advisory panel, the Washington State Department of Agriculture developed
an eradication plan and the governor proclaimed a state of emergency to
prevent the beetle from becoming established in Washington.176 Under the
eradication plan, all potential host species within a one-eighth mile radius
of the infestation site were removed despite no proof of infection. 177 MS.
Malbrain and other property owners lost trees because they were
susceptible to being commandeered by the invasive beetle.' 7 8 Fruit, alder,
willow, oak, and some conifer trees owned by fifty-one landowners were
destroyed on approximately thirty-two acres.179 The state arranged to pay
landowners for the purchase of replacement plants and supplied vouchers
that could be used to purchase non-host species of vegetation. 8 0 Some
landowners were unhappy with the loss of their plants and were not
satisfied with the state's payment scheme, so they brought a lawsuit
claiming inverse condemnation and requested payment for the value of
plants taken.' 8'
The Malbrain appellate court concluded that the

174. See Alan Romero, Takings by Floodwaters, 76 N.D. L. REV. 785, 788-97 (2000)
(distinguishing among different types of flooding and the requirement of compensation
under the Takings Clause).
175. See 86 P.3d 222, 223 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
176. See id. at 223-24.
177. See id. at 223.
178. See id at 224. The eradication program also included insecticide injections in
trees for the next one-eighth mile. Id. at 223.
179. See id.
180. See Malbrain, 86 P.3d at 224.
18 1. See id.
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destruction of property to avert the dissemination of the beetle did not
require compensation.182

The appellate court noted the general rule that physical invasions by
governments are takings.183 However, the court also observed that there
were exceptions to the rule as some physical invasions are not takings.' 84
Moreover, governmental destruction of property does not always require
compensation.' 85 In destroying trees that were a real property interest, the
state had temporarily entered the plaintiffs' property in response to an
emergency.186 The governmental action caused injury to the property, but
the government did not permanently occupy the properties so it was not a
In finding that there was no
permanent physical occupation.'8
compensable taking, the Malbrain court found that the infestation created
an emergency; the situation was similar to cases applying the law of
necessity or the conflagration doctrine. 8 8 In addressing an emergency
such as fire or pestilence, a government may employ reasonable means
without being obligated to pay for property taken. 189 For insect pests,
property owners do not have a right to use their property in a manner
creating a nuisance that interferes with the general welfare of the
community.' 90 Thus, the state's action of destroying plants in an exposure
zone did not effect a compensable taking.'91
Florida's approach to eradicating citrus canker was similar to
Washington's actions to eradicate the citrus longhorned beetle. DACS
adopted an eradication program, the Florida legislature declared citrus
canker to be a nuisance, and the legislature approved statutory provisions
for the eradication of the disease. 192 Both the Washington and Florida
agencies relied on recommendations from scientific panels for devising

182. See id. at 225.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 224-25.

185. See Malbrain, 86 P.3d at 227 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40
(1960) for the conclusion that governments can destroy property without
compensation).
186. See id. at 227 (observing there was no permanent occupation).
187. See id. at 225.
188. See id. at 226-27. For the emergency, the state did not need to wait for the
infestation to occur. Id. at 227.
189. See id. at 226-28 (citing Miller v. Schoene, 376 U.S. 272 (1928)).
190. See Malbrain, 86 P.3d at 227.
191. See id at 229.
192. See 2002 Fla. Laws ch. 11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 581.184 (2002), amended
by s. 1, ch. 2006-45); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 5B-58.001, 5B-62.003
(2008).
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their eradication efforts.193 The invasions under both programs were
temporary and property owners subsequently had the right to exclude
others from their properties.1 9 4 Both programs involved the destruction of
all host plants in exposure zones, with nominal compensation to owners
who lost valuable plants. Yet the Washington court found no compensable
taking due to the emergency created by the invasive foreign pest.
At the request of the plaintiffs, the Malbrain court considered the
Florida Supreme Court's decision in Department of Agriculture &
Consumer Services v. Mid-Florida Growers 95 involving the destruction of
citrus trees under a Florida eradication program.' 96 The Washington court
interpreted Florida law as not requiring compensation for nondiseased
destroyed trees in a zone that created a nuisance or emergency. 197 While
the Malbrain dicta are not controlling in Florida, it sets forth the position
that the control of a disease allows for the destruction of healthy property
in legislatively-prescribed exposure zones.' 98 Because the Bogorff trial and
appellate courts declined to recognize citrus canker as constituting a public
nuisance, they found that property owners needed to be compensated.199 If
DACS's actions were under its police power to address a nuisance, the
Malbrian analysis of takings suggests that the Bogorff trial and appellate
courts erred in finding a compensable taking. 200

193. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *1011, TT 26-30 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008); DACSs Initial Brief,supra note 43, at 2;
Malbrain,86 P.3d at 223.
194. The right to exclude is characterized as the most fundamental of all property
interests. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
195. 521 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
196. See Malbrain,86 P.3d at 228-29.
197. See id. at 229 (interpreting Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs.,
870 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2004) as not requiring compensation for the destruction of trees
that were not infected).
198. See id.
199. The Bogorfif trial court claimed that citrus canker was not a public nuisance by
failing to consider public welfare. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08),
2008 WL 8566964, at *15, 47; 25, 80 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008); Dep't. of Agric.
and Consumer Serv. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 89 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
200. In responding to the Bogorff takings allegation, DACS declined to claim that its
destruction of trees was an emergency response. In its initial brief, DACS never used
the word "emergency." See DACS's Initial Brief, supra note 43. In the reply brief,
DACS declined to claim that its emergency police power justified the citrus canker
eradication program. Reply Brief of Florida Department of Agriculture, etc., at 6, In re
Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., Sep. 21, 2009); but see
FLA. STAT. § 581.031(6) (2010) (authority for DACS to declare citrus canker a
nuisance); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 5B-62.003 (2010) (listing citrus canker
as a nuisance).
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2. Spray Damage from Eradicating the Mediterranean Fruit Fly
A second example of an invasion of property to eradicate an insect
pest was reported in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Calhfornia.20 1 The
state of California took action to control an invasion of the Mediterranean
fruit fly. 2 02 Under state authority, the California Department of Food and
Agriculture adopted regulations delineating eradication areas in which the
use of insecticides and chemicals could be employed to eliminate the
The state administrative code identified premises within
pest. 2 03
eradication areas as public nuisances subject to all relevant laws relating to
nuisance prevention and abatement.2 04 When the infestation proved more
difficult to control than originally thought, the governor declared a state of
emergency, and power under this emergency supplemented the
administrative code's provisions. 20 5 The state invaded private property
through an aerial spray program that deposited chemicals on properties
susceptible to an infestation. 206
The state's actions in controlling the Mediterranean fruit fly resulted
in incidental damages to automobile paint.2 07 In Farmers Insurance
Exchange, insurance companies sued the state in inverse condemnation for
damages incurred by vehicle owners that the insurance companies were
208
In defense, the state argued the program was an
obliged to pay.
emergency response to an insect pest under its police power so that
damages inflicted were noncompensable. 2 09 The appellate court agreed
with the state. 2 10 In reaching this result, the California court observed that
emergencies justifying police action without compensation included the
demolition of buildings to prevent the spread of a conflagration and the
destruction of diseased animals, plants, and fruit. 2 1 1 A government's action
will be upheld as part of a government's police power if it was reasonably
necessary to protect order, health, and general welfare.2 12 State action to

201.

221 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).

202. See id. at 227.
203. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 3591.5 (2010).
204. See id.at § 6762.
205. See FarmersIns. Exchange, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
206. See id. at 227-29.
207. See id. at 229.
208. See id. at 227.
209. See id. at 229 (citing as justification damnum absque injuriaunder the exercise
of its police power).
210. See FarmersIns. Exchange, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
211. See id. at 229 (citing earlier case law).

212. See id.
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eradicate a fruit fly infestation fell within this emergency exception.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' private interests were subservient to the right of
the state to proceed in a manner to protect public health and safety. 2 14 The
state did not have to compensate the insurance companies for claims paid
on damaged vehicles.
California's approach to eradicating an agricultural pest was similar
to that employed by Florida. Both states' eradication programs were
adopted under governmental authority, both involved temporary invasions
onto private properties that damaged property interests, and both involved
damages to property in exposure zones without proof that the properties
were infested. With the termination of the eradication efforts, property
owners had complete control of their properties. The decision in Farmers
Insurance Exchange supports the conclusion that DACS's actions did not
constitute a compensable taking. 2 15 Because Florida was responding to a
pest under a legislative decision to safeguard public welfare, compensation
is not required. However, because the Bogorff trial and appellate courts
refused to recognize the disease created a nuisance, they concluded that the
state had no justification under its police power for destroying property
without compensation.2 16
3. Demolishing Blighted Buildings
Numerous governments have enacted legislation under which
buildings on private properties can be demolished to protect the public
from dangerous situations.2 17 This occurs when the government exercises
its police power and adopts a municipal ordinance or law permitting
demolition of dangerous buildings.218 No compensation is required when a
government destroys property to protect the public from a dangerous

condition. 2 19 Although the actions may involve physical entries on owners'

213. See id.
214. See id.
215. However, although the legislature found introduction of citrus canker to
constitute an emergency, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 308, DACS did not raise an emergency as
a defense in the lawsuit. See supra note 200.
216. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at * 15,
47; 25, 80 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008); Dep't of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v.
Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
217. See Davet v. Cleveland, 456 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2006); Hoeck v. Portland, 57
F.3d 781, 787 (9th Cir. 1995); Vill. of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 810 N.E.2d 13, 27 (Ill.
2004), appeal denied, 2004 Ill. LEXIS 999 (1ll. May 24, 2004).
218. See, e.g., Vill. of Lake Villa, 810 N.E.2d at 28, 31 (finding a demolition
provision constitutional and that a building was dangerous and unsafe).
219. See Sershen v. Cholish, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117772, at 34 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
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properties and the destruction of property with value, if it is a legitimate
exercise of the police power to confront a nuisance and the invasion is
temporary, the government does not need to pay for the destroyed

property. 22 0
These cases show that whenever a government destroys property
pursuant to a police-power regulation, the issue is not simply whether there
was a physical invasion. Physical invasions are permitted if individuals'
private property rights are subservient to the public welfare.22 1
Compensation is not required for physical invasions if the government's
action responded to an emergency or a public nuisance. Absent a valid
justification, however, actions by a government that take property are
compensable.
4. Temporary Flooding Caused by Governmental Action
A fourth category of temporary invasions to private properties
involves governmental actions resulting in flooding. Courts distinguish
between permanent flooding and temporary periods of flooding.222
Permanent invasions by floodwaters resulting from governmental action
require compensation as takings of owners' property rights.223 For most

220. See Hendrix v. Plambeck, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 8787 (7th Cir. 2011); Hoeck
v. Portland, 57 F.3d 781, 787 (9th Cir. 1995).
221. See Davet, 456 F.3d at 553.
222. See John J. Constonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A DecisionalModelfor
the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 543-50 (1983) (critiquing Loretto's
differentiation of permanent occupation from temporary invasion to suggest that the
real issue is the denial of owners' rights to exclude others from properties); Romero,
supra note 174, at 788-89 (noting that if a governmental action causes flooding that is
permanent, the property owner is entitled to compensation under the Fifth
Amendment).
223. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, Nos. 2009-5121, 2010-5029,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 6417 (Fed. Cir. March 30, 2011) (differentiating temporary
from permanent flooding and finding flooding that was temporary did not require
compensation); Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924) (acknowledging
that there was no permanent invasion of private property by governmental action so
plaintiff did not prove a taking); Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that a permanent physical occupation by waters of private land
would be a compensable taking); Murphy v. Vill. of Plainfield, No. 08 CV 3293, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26960, at 22 -24 (D. 111.March 31, 2009) (observing that proof of an
unconstitutional taking by flooding requires a permanent invasion of land amounting to
an appropriation); Drake v. Walton Cnty., 6 So. 3d 717, 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
(observing that governments cannot divert floodwater onto the property of another
without compensating that property owner); VLX Properties, Inc. v. So. States
Utilities, Inc., No. 5D99-3314, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 9251, at 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (finding physical occupation meant there was a taking); Spaeth v. City of
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temporary invasions, courts examine the nature and magnitude of the
governmental action.224 Intermittent flooding resulting in a temporary
physical invasion may constitute the taking of an easement.225 However,
flooding due to rare storms or special events does not rise to the level of a
compensable taking. 22 6 For other situations, temporary invasions may be
tortious acts and consequential damages could be appropriate.22
Cases involving flooding in Florida suggest that DACS's invasions in
Bogorff a one-time event to remove trees in exposure zones, did not
constitute a compensable taking. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
opined that temporary takings theory requires an ongoing regulatory taking
to be recognized under inverse condemnation; otherwise, the injured
parties should seek damages under negligence. 22 8 The Fifth District was
more open to finding temporary invasions to be takings by suggesting that
substantial periodic flooding constitutes a taking. 2 29

Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 822 (Minn. 1984) (finding that the city could not abate the
flooding so the city needed to commence eminent domain proceedings).
224. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 6417, at 28-29
(focusing on the governmental policy rather than the nature of the action); Ridge Line,
Inc, 346 F.3d at 1356 (looking at the nature of the governmental action).
225. See Ridge Line, Inc, 346 F.3d. at 1354 (observing that permanent destruction or
exclusive occupation is not always required); S. Fla. Water Manage. Dist. v. Basore of
Fla., Inc., 723 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 740 So. 2d
527 (1999) (recognizing authority that temporary flooding may result in a taking and
noting that accidental crop damage from negligence would not be a compensable
taking); Allianz Global Risks U.S. Ins. Co. v. New Hampshire, No. 2009-745, 2010
N.H. LEXIS 127, at 7-8 (N.H. Nov. 10, 2010) (noting that temporary takings may be
compensable).
226. See, e.g., S. Fla. Water Manage. Dist., 723 So. 2d at 288, 290 (deciding that a
one in fifty-year storm event was not a taking); Anhalt v. Cities & Villages Mut. Ins.
Co., 637 N.W.2d 422, 435 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (observing that with no permanent

physical occupation, there was no taking).
227. See e.g., Ridge Line, Inc., 346 F.3d at 1358 (observing that the facts need to be
examined to determine whether there was a compensable taking or whether tort law
applies); Allianz Global Risks U.S. Ins. Co., 2010 N.H. LEXIS 127, at 7 (citing Barnes
v. United States, 538 F.2d 865, 870, where the court found that the water invasion to
plaintiffs property was not a taking but rather a tort).
228. S. Fla. Water Manage. Dist., 723 So. 2d at 290 (declining to go beyond what the
Supreme Court enunciated in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.

Cnty. of Los Angeles 482 U.S. 304).
229. See VLX Properties, Inc. v. So. States Utilities, Inc., No. 5D99-3314, 2000 Fla.
App. LEXIS 9251, at 9 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). We find that the rule applied in
Associates of Meadow Lake, Inc. is more in line with the emerging law that recognizes

the right to compensation for temporary takings.

Id.

See also, e.g., Tampa-

Hillsborough Cnty. Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S., Corp. 640 So. 2d 54, 58 (Fla.
1994). The facts of the VLX Properties case, however, presented a takings case
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The federal and Florida cases seem to be in agreement that temporary
invasions of a recurring nature effect compensable takings. 23 0 The issue
involves "the character of the invasion." 2 31 But the flooding cases suggest
that destroyed property and consequential damages are not enough to
establish a taking. Rather, the government's action must destroy the
property's actual usefulness and value.23 2 DACS's actions lack the
character of invasions that are compensable because the removal of trees
under Florida's eradication program only interfered with an owner's
property once, the state provided funds for replacement trees, owners
retained the usefulness of their residential properties, and owners thereafter
were free from governmental interference. Under flooding jurisprudence,
the Bogorff plaintiffs cannot show recurrences that are required to establish
a compensable taking.
D. DACS's Invasions andDestruction of Trees
Returning to the Bogorff inverse condemnation lawsuit, to justify a
conclusion that DACS's invasions and destruction of trees constituted a
taking, proof under one of the categories of takings was required. Judicial
evaluations of physical invasions in other courts show that the existence of
a physical invasion does not mean there is an unconstitutional taking; under
the U.S. Constitution, only permanent physical occupations are per se
takings. 2 33 Additionally, invasions and other actions that render property
valueless are categorical takings. All other physical invasions may
constitute regulatory takings if the burdens imposed are too severe.
1. No Permanent Occupation or Categorical Taking
The Bogorff trial court cited a definition of a taking as:
entering upon private property for more than a momentary
period and, under the warrant or color of legal authority,
devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally
involving flooding rather than flooding causing a taking. See VLX Properties Inc.,
2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 9251, at *6.
230. See Romero, supra note 174, at 789 (acknowledging something less than
permanent flooding may constitute a taking).
231. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982);
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917); Fla. East Coast Properties, Inc. v.
Metro. Dade County, 572 F.2d 1108, 1111 (5th Cir. 1978) (referring to the "character
of the invasion" as the key question to determine whether there is a taking).
232. See Fla. East Coast Properties,Inc., 572 F.2d at 1111 (differentiating a taking
from tortious invasions).
233. See supra Part II.A.
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appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such way as
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof.23 4
With this definition, however, the court did not explain how DACS's
actions operated to oust owners and deprive them of all beneficial
enjoyment of their properties. The homeowners lost citrus trees, received
funds to replace them, and continued to use their properties as
residences.235 Because owners were never substantially ousted from their
properties, the Bogorif trial court lacked justification for finding a taking
under its definition.
Turning to Florida legal precedents, an evaluation of the facts shows
that the destruction and removal of citrus trees did not constitute a
permanent physical occupation or recurring invasion of an owner's
236
While the trees were permanently destroyed, DACS's action
property.
was a temporary invasion to control the dissemination of a disease. With
the removal of infected trees and trees in exposure zones, the state exited
the properties. DACS's actions preserved for owners their rights to
exclude others from their properties.237 In the absence of a permanent
physical occupation, there was no per se taking.
With respect to the issue of whether DACS's action resulted in a
categorical taking, the facts show that the destruction of citrus trees did not
deprive property owners of all economic value or use of their properties. 2 38
Despite the invasion and destruction of trees, property owners were able to
continue with the use of their real estate. Moreover, although citrus trees
were destroyed, the state provided owners funds to purchase replacement
plants. 239 Florida courts follow federal law in observing that categorical

234. In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *38, 1 6
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008) (citing Poe v. State Road Dep't, 127 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961), which quoted 12 FLA. JUR., EMINENT DOMAIN § 68).
235.

The court separates the trees from the land. This is improper. See Clark v. J.W.

Conner & Sons, Inc., 441 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (trees are part of
the value of the underlying property).

236. The flooding cases suggest that recurring physical invasions may be
compensable. See infra Part II.C.4.
237. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)
(noting that the right to exclude is "one of the most essential sticks" in a property
owner's bundle of rights).
238. In fact, one real estate appraiser testified that most residents had no diminution
in their property value as a result of the removal of their citrus trees. See DACS's
Initial Brief, supra note 43, at 45-46.
239. See FLA. STAT. § 541.1845 (2010), repealed by 2010 Fla. Laws 35 (providing

$55 per tree); Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 91 (Fla.
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takings are limited to situations where property owners are deprived of "all
economically beneficial or productive use." 24 0 Thus, under takings
jurisprudence, DACS's actions did not effect a categorical taking.
2. Inadequate Analysis to Find a Regulatory Taking
For regulatory takings, federal jurisprudence holds that owners'
claims should be analyzed under the factors set forth by the Supreme Court
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.241 The major
consideration is the severity of the burden that the government has imposed
on the owners' property rights.242 Florida courts have recognized that the
Penn Central balancing test is appropriate for regulatory takings,243 but
have expanded the factors. In Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.,2 44 the
Florida Supreme Court listed six factors to be used to determine whether a
regulation is a legitimate exercise of the police power.2 45
In finding that DACS's actions were a compensable taking, the
Bogorff trial court delineated the six factors enumerated by the Graham
court:
1. Whether there is a physical invasion of the property.
2. The degree to which there is a diminution in value of
the property. Or stated another way, whether the
regulation precludes all economically reasonable use
of the property.
3. Whether the regulation confers a public benefit or
prevents a public harm.

Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (noting the $55 per tree statutory payments and retail gift cards as
being paid to owners losing trees).
240. See Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 869 (citing Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
241. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
242. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (drawing the
regulatory takings test from the unique burdens imposed by physical takings); see also
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
243. See Keshbro, 801 So. 2d at 871 (observing that regulations falling short of
categorical takings are analyzed under a Penn Central inquiry); Shands v. City of
Marathon, 999 So. 2d 718, 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that anything less
than the elimination of total value is analyzed under the factors enumerated in Penn
Central); Leon County v. Gluesenkamp, 873 So. 2d 460, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(enumerating three factors from Penn Central for evaluating whether a regulation
constitutes a taking).
244. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S.
1083 (1981).
245. See id. at 1380-81.
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4. Whether the regulation promotes the health, safety,
welfare, or morals of the public.
5. Whether the regulation is arbitrarily and capriciously
applied.
6. The extent to which the regulation curtails investmentbacked expectations. 246
However, the Bogorfif trial court declined to evaluate DACS's actions
under the listed factors. 24 7 Rather, the court analyzed the issue of the value
of trees destroyed but did not evaluate the character and nature of the
burden as required under Graham or Penn Central.248 In concluding that
physical invasions accompanied by destroyed trees were dispositive, the
trial court failed to analyze the severity of the burden imposed by the
state's action and did not acknowledge the distinction between permanent
occupations and temporary invasions.249 Instead, the court proceeded to
selectively evaluate and cite judicial precedents concentrating on the trees
destroyed, never considering the six factors it enumerated.25 0
For example, Graham lists "[t]he degree to which there is a
diminution in value of the property. Or stated another way, whether the
regulation precludes all economically reasonable use of the property." 25 1
The Bogorfif trial court never considered the value of the plaintiffs'
properties and failed to acknowledge that the destroyed trees were a minor
part of their properties' value.2 52 Under inverse condemnation claims,
courts focus on the nature and extent of the government's interference with
owners' rights in the parcel as a whole to determine whether the actions

246. Id.
247. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *4047, TT 11-21 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
248. See id. at *15-23, TT 48-74. The court did not look at the characteristics of
DACS's intrusion onto a property or consider the extent of the intrusion to the use of
the property as a residence. Id. There was no evidence that residents were excluded
from their residences. Id.
249. See id.; see also Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84,
90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
250. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *15-23, IT 48-74.
251. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1380 (Fla. 1981).
252. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964 at *45-46, 19 (claiming that
the property's value did not matter since only the trees from the properties were taken);
see also Horn v. Corkland Corp., 518 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(reporting that a trespass which resulted in the destruction of trees had not changed the
value of the property so there were no damages); Clark v. J.W. Conner & Sons, Inc.,
441 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that trees are part of the value of
the underlying property).
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effect a taking.253 The Bogorfif trial and appellate courts also rejected
evidence that the eradication of citrus canker bacteria was to prevent harm
to producers and the state's economy.254 In declining to acknowledge that
infected trees have decreased fruit yields thereby harming producers, the
courts erred in applying the third factor listed by the Graham court.
Turning to the fourth factor, courts need to consider public welfare.255
In responding to plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim, the Bogorff trial
court limited its analysis to threats to "public health, safety or morals."2 56
Similarly, in considering DACS's nuisance defense, the trial court opined
that "[c]itrus canker does not pose a threat to the health or safety of humans
or animals."257 By omitting consideration of public welfare, the trial court
failed to consider a valid justification for DACS's destruction of trees in
exposure zones.258 Associated with the court's refusal to consider public
welfare is its refusal to acknowledge that trees infected with citrus canker
have decreased yields so that failure to eradicate the disease would affect
homeowners.2 59
Finally, while citing the Graham factors that trial courts should
consider in determining whether a regulation constitutes a taking, the
Bogorff trial and appellate courts omitted an examination of the extent to
260
which the regulation interfered with investment-backed expectations.
The plaintiffs continued to live in their homes and the removal of the trees
resulted in no decrease in the properties' values. 2 6 1 DACS's temporary
invasions were not that intensive.

253. See State, Dep't of Envtl. Regulation v. Schindler, 604 So. 2d 565, 568 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (noting the requirement to evaluate the whole property); see also
Taylor v. Vill. of North Palm Beach, 659 So. 2d 1167, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(citing with approval the Schindler decision to evaluate unitary parcels); Fla. Game &
Fresh Water Fish Comm'n v. Flotilla, Inc., 636 So. 2d 761, 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (concluding that in deciding whether governmental actions effect a taking, the
whole property needs to be considered).
254. See infra Part IIL.B.
255. See Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1381.
256. In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *15, 47.
257. Id. at *25, 80.
258. See Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 782 (Fla.
2004) (concluding the citrus eradication program was a legitimate objective to further
public welfare).
259. See USDA Assessment, supra note 40, at 6 (noting heavy losses in commercial
and private citrus production from citrus canker).
260. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *45-46, 19; Dep't. of
Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 89-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010);
see Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1381; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
261. See DACS's Initial Brief supra note 43, at 45-6.
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On appeal, the Bogorff appellate court declined to look at the unique
circumstances of DACS's intrusions because it felt that a physical invasion
was sufficient to establish a taking. 26 2 The court claimed that "[t]he facts
of this case require no application of multi-part, recondite tests to decide
whether the State regulation has gone too far and must pay just
compensation." 26 3 Because the Bogorfif trial and appellate courts omitted
consideration of public welfare and did not look at the factors required by
Graham, the courts lacked justification for finding a regulatory taking.264
This shows the courts' decisions as arbitrary and capricious; there was no
permanent physical occupation, no categorical taking, and inadequate proof
to establish a regulatory taking. Under Florida law, the appellate court
erred in upholding the trial court.265
IV.

Altering Takings Jurisprudence

The state's decision to destroy citrus trees to eradicate citrus canker in
Florida was contentious due to the different objectives of the state's citrus
industry and thousands of noncommercial growers, some of whom were
the plaintiffs-homeowners in the Bogorfif lawsuit. The industry favored
eradication efforts based on cost-benefit projections that the elimination of
citrus canker would prove economically advantageous in the long run.266
Since infected trees usually bear some edible fruit, homeowners felt the
disease was not that troublesome.2 67 This meant that many homeowners
preferred to preserve their citrus trees regardless of the presence of disease
and did not support the eradication program requiring the destruction of
trees in exposure zones.268
In approaching the Bogorff plaintiffs' claim of a taking, the trial and
appellate courts seem to have been blinded by the physical invasion of
DACS's personnel onto plaintiffs' properties and public sentiment that

262. See Bogorff 35 So. 3d at 89-90.
263. Id at 90 (emphasis in original).
264. See Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Polk, 568 So. 2d 35, 39 (Fla. 1990)
(requiring an analysis of the factors in Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1380-81).
265. See Rubano v. Dep't of Transp., 656 So. 2d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 1995) (noting that
proof of a taking is required as an element of an inverse condemnation claim).
266. See Schubert et al., supra note 33, at 346 (reporting that commercial growers
realized that in the long run they would be better off if the disease were eradicated).
267. See id. (reporting that although citrus canker is not fatal, it leads to reduced fruit
production and detracts from the ornamental value of trees owned by residential
property owners).
268. See id. (reporting that citizens did not realize that the debilitating affects of the
disease favored an eradication program).
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eradication was to benefit the citrus industry.269 In reaching their
conclusion that there was a compensable taking, the trial and appellate
courts addressed not only the takings issue but also the legitimacy of
DACS's action under the legislatively-approved eradication program. An
examination of the courts' opinions identifies how an activist judiciary has
discretion in analyzing takings claims and may select evidence to support a
decision that ignores scientific and legislative findings.
A. Analyzing a Takings through a Due Process Analysis

For the inverse condemnation claim in Bogorff the trial court
proceeded to assume that it was "the trier of all issues, legal and factual,
except for the question of what constitutes just compensation."27 But, in
addressing the claim, the trial court proceeded to evaluate more than
whether DACS's actions had taken the plaintiffs' property without the
payment of adequate compensation. The trial court specifically addressed
the issue of whether the plaintiffs' citrus trees presented an imminent threat
to welfare or constituted a public nuisance.2 71 In addressing public welfare,
the court examined the state's police power. Pursuant to existing case law,
this meant that the plaintiffs had implicated and the court considered
272
In analyzing the public purpose of the
substantive due process concerns.
state's citrus canker eradication program, the propriety of the state's
actions, and whether the property taken had value, the trial court's
deliberations involved consideration of both the Takings and Due Process
Clauses.2 7 3

269. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *1523,
48-74 (Fla Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008); Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v.
Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84. 89-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). The appellate court stated that
physical invasions were "the clearest example of a governmental taking for which just
compensation is due." Bogorff, 35 So. 3d at 89. The court also decided that since
citrus canker was not dangerous to humans, the eradication program was to benefit the
citrus industry. Id.
270. In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *2.
75-100.
271. Seeid.at 2-3,T2;23-31,
272. See Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 781 (Fla.
2004).
273. In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *23, T 73 (considering the
purpose of the 1900-foot policy); id. at 30, N 97 (determining that a study employed by
the state to justify the eradication program was flawed); id. at 30-3 1, 98 (finding that
the state could not do what was required for eradication); id. at 31, 99 (evaluating the
state's records of infestation). The trial court impliedly admitted it was a due process
issue in its conclusions of law by citing the Haire district court: "[t]his action does not
violate due process. . . ." Id. at 43-44, 16.
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However, the Bogorfif trial court proceeded to evaluate both the
takings and due process issues by analyzing plaintiffs' claims as a taking
for which the court would act as the trier of facts.274 By evaluating issues
concerning the legitimacy of the eradication program as a taking rather
than under the due process clause, the trial court employed the wrong
inquiry.275 Federal, state, and Florida courts have distinguished inquiries
that are appropriate for takings from those to be used in evaluating a denial
of due process.276 Under Florida law, governments may regulate the use of
property or even destroy property without compensation under their police
power if the action is based on an emergency or responds to a public
nuisance. 277
1. Differentiating Takings from Due Process
In questioning the legitimacy of the 1900-foot exposure zone, the
Bogorff trial court was not addressing the issue of a taking. A takings
claim considers the actual burden on property rights imposed by the
regulation, with courts determining whether the statute is "functionally
comparable to government appropriation or invasion of private
property." 27 8 In analyzing the legitimacy of the 1900-foot exposure zone,
the Bogorfif court was addressing a due process challenge. In Florida,
constitutional provisions on just compensation and due process are
contained in separate provisions of the Florida Constitution and "the

274. See id. at 2; 9-15, f 24-47.
275. See Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 625 (Fla. 1990)
(noting the difference between eminent domain and police power); see also Dreher,
supra note 97, at 387-88 (identifying the legitimacy of a government's action as a due
process issue separate from takings); Karkkainen, supra note 90, at 828 (noting that
Lingle separates takings jurisprudence from due process).
276. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005) (limiting the
substantially advances formula to due process inquiries and finding it is inappropriate
for a takings test); Gray v. Thone, 194 N.W. 961, 963 (Iowa 1923) (recognizing the
distinction between eminent domain and the police power); Haire, 870 So. 2d at 78081(observing two separate constitutional provisions that protect property rights: takings
and due process); Balch v. Glenn, 119 P. 67, 69-70 (Kan. 1911) (differentiating takings
from the limitation or destruction of property under the exercise of the police power).
277. See Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1957) (observing that the
police power is broad but that the destruction of property under the power "is justified
only within the narrowest limits of actual necessity, unless the state chooses to pay
compensation.").
278. See Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1284 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
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analysis under due process is different from the analysis under just
compensation."2 79
Article X, section 6 of the Florida Constitution delineates Florida's
just compensation clause: "No private property shall be taken except for a
public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or
secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the
owner." 280 Florida's Due Process Clause is contained in Article I, section
9, and reads: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against
oneself."281
"[C]ourts frequently fail to make the distinction between two ways in
which government may abuse its power." 282 Just compensation involves
the taking of property because of its need for the public use. Furthermore,
under the Takings Clause, overbearing interference in property rights by
the government is precluded.2 83 Due process involves the regulation of
property to prevent its use in a manner that is detrimental to the public
interest.284 It also involves the arbitrariness of governmental regulations,
which involves the legitimacy of a statute or regulation.285 In addressing
the legitimacy of the scientific study recommending the 1900-foot
exposure zone, the Bogorff trial court was engaged in a due process
inquiry; it involved a question of arbitrariness in establishing the distance
of the exposure zone.
Under the Florida Constitution, the requirement of due process is
analyzed under a rational relationship test. 286 With respect to personal
property, this involves the question of whether the government can justify
its infringement of property rights by a legitimate governmental
287
objective.
A statute must bear "a reasonable relation to a permissible

279. Tampa-Hillsborough Cnty. Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S., Corp., 640 So. 2d
54, 57 (Fla. 1994).
280. FLA. CONST. art. X,§ 6 (2010).
281. Id.atart.1,§9.
282. Tampa-HillsboroughCnty., 640 So. 2d at 57 (citing Patrick Wiseman, When the
End Justifies the Means: Understanding Takings JurisprudenceIn a Legal System With
Integrity, 63 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 433, 438 (1988)).

283. See id.
284. See Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 781 (Fla.
2004).
285. See id.at 782.
286. See State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1214 (Fla. 2004) (analyzing a due
process argument).
287. See id.; see also Suit v. State, 906 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 2005) (observing that
the rational basis test requires a legitimate governmental interest); State v. Saiez, 489
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legislative objective and [cannot be] discriminatory, arbitrary, or
oppressive." 28 8 In determining whether a statute bears a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate governmental objective under a rational basis
test, any reasonable relationship between the act and the furtherance of a
valid governmental objective suffices.2 89
Concerning the state's citrus canker eradication program, the Florida
Supreme Court had previously considered its legitimacy; the court found in
Haire v. Florida Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services that
"there is no question that the protection of the citrus industry is a legitimate
objective for the use of the State's police power." 2 90 Other judicial
precedents noted that the citrus industry plays an important role in the
state's economy so police power-based regulations will be upheld by the
courts. 291 However, the Bogorff trial court declined to accept the
legitimacy of the state's eradication program by questioning whether
DACS's action in destroying all trees in exposure zones involved a threat
to public welfare.292 While the court acknowledged a rational basis test, it
weighed the evidence and felt a second study was required to justify the
1900-foot exposure zone.2 93
Under Florida law, courts do not weigh evidence for due process
claims.294 Rather, any credible evidence is sufficient and no second

So. 2d 1125, 1127 (Fla. 1986) (noting that the due process clause allows governments
to interfere with property rights but places limits on the interferences).
288. Warren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 1090, 1096 (Fla. 2005).
289. See Robinson, 873 So. 2d at 1214.
290. Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 781-82 (Fla.
2004).

291.

See Coca-Cola Co. v. Florida, 406 So. 2d 1079, 1085-86 (Fla. 1981) (upholding

regulations prescribing labeling requirements for Florida citrus products). In 2003, a
district court had taken judicial notice that the state's citrus industry is a great asset and
the industry's protection "redounds greatly to the general welfare of the
commonwealth." Haire, 836 So. 2d at 1047 (citing earlier pronouncements by the
Florida Supreme Court that the protection of the citrus industry affected the welfare of
so many that its protection is within the police power of the sovereign); see also
Johnson v. State, 128 So. 853, 857 (Fla. 1930) (acknowledging the state's citrus
industry as affecting the welfare of the state).
292. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *3,
2;11T31; 15 47 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
293. See id. at *9, T 24-25.
294. See Haire, 870 So. 2d at 787 (noting that "under a rational basis test, 'a
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding"'); see also Lucas v.
Englewood Cmty. Hospital, 963 So. 2d 894, 896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Hudson v.
Florida, 825 So. 2d 460, 468-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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opinion is required.2 95 Given the state legislature's justification for
adopting the citrus eradication program, 296 DACS had no obligation to
produce additional evidence to sustain its program.29 7 Since the evidence
adduced at trial showed a credible scientific study justifying the exposure
zone, the Bogorff trial court developed a new methodology for analyzing
takings claims under the Florida Constitution. The court declined to
acknowledge the due process issues by rolling them into the takings
allegation.
2. Rejecting the Scientific Study
The Bogorff trial court rejected the scientific study forming the basis
for the state's citrus canker eradication program. 2 98 With this conclusion,
the court decided the eradication program was not an appropriate
regulation under the state's police power.2 99 The validity of the scientific
study does not concern whether there was a taking; it involves due process.
Because this issue involved the state's justification for its eradication
program rather than how the regulatory action burdened plaintiffs'
properties, it cannot be evaluated as part of the takings claim. 3 0o Instead,
the Bogorff court needed to distinguish the plaintiffs' takings claim from
their argument concerning the validity of the state's eradication program.
On appeal, DACS argued that the court improperly rejected its evidence,
but the appellate court failed to see the due process issue so retorted that

295. See Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n v. Thomas, 434 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 1983).
"Under a "rational basis" standard of review a court should inquire only whether it is
conceivable that the regulatory classification bears some rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose." Id.
296. See 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 308.
297. See Hudson, 825 So. 2d at 468-69.
298. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *9,
24; 30, 97; 48, 25 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
299. See id.; see also Tampa-Hillsborough Cnty. Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S.,
Corp., 640 So. 2d 54, 58 (Fla. 1994) (observing that a constitutional challenge to a
statutory mechanism involves due process).
300. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005) (noting that due
process is to protect individuals from the exercise of a state's police power without any
reasonable justification); Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 127677 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (disapproving of the "substantially advances" test for due process);
Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 786 (Fla. 2004)
(noting that a trial court cannot reject legislative choices based on the court's view of
the scientific evidence); Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 625
(Fla. 1990) (observing that the police power involves the regulation of property to
prevent use detrimental to public interest).
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trial courts weigh evidence. 30 1 By not employing a due process analysis to
evaluate the latter claim, the trial and appellate courts departed from
existing jurisprudence to respond to the plaintiffs' claims. 30 2
The state's eradication program was initially adopted by DACS, and
later endorsed by the state legislature. 303 The program's exposure zone
was based on a study by a USDA scientist who was an expert on citrus
canker.304 Subsequently, a task force of regulatory individuals, scientists,
and citrus industry representatives who dealt with citrus canker
unanimously recommended the adoption of the study's 1900-foot exposure
zone.305 The trial court, however, decided to question the merits of the
study and summarily decided that DACS failed to determine whether "the
Gottwald study was based on sound scientific principles."306 But, the
Florida Supreme Court had already heard a similar challenge in Haire v.
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services.307
In
addressing the issue of whether the citrus canker law was a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power, the supreme court replied:
[A]ll that is required is that the law not be arbitrary or
capricious, and the Court need only determine that the law
bears a reasonable and substantial relationship to the purpose
sought to be attained. Under this standard of review,
referred to as either the reasonable relationship or the
rational basis test, a "state statute must be upheld . . . if there

is any reasonable relationship between the act and the
furtherance of a valid governmental objective."30 8
The Bogorfif trial court also failed to follow the supreme court's
finding that the legislature's adoption of the 1900-foot eradication zone

301. See Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 87-88 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
302. See Dreher, supra note 97, at 402-403 (predicting that by distinguishing
between takings and due process challenges, few governmental regulations will effect a
regulatory taking).
303. See 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 308.
304. See Gottwald et al., supra note 11, at 32 (reporting the study advocating the
1900-foot radius). An earlier supreme court decision had cited Dr. Gottwald as an

expert in epidemiology, plant pathology, and citrus canker. See Haire v. Fla. Dep't. of
Agric. and Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 778-79 (Fla. 2004).
305. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *1011,
26-30 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008); DACSs InitialBrief supra note 43, at 2.
306. In re Citrus Canker Litig., 2008 WL 8566964, at *9, TT 24-25.
307. 870 So.2d 774, 782 (Fla. 2004).
308. Id. (citing Lane v. Chiles, 698 So. 2d 260, 262 (Fla. 1997)).
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was justified by the best available science.309 In Haire, the court noted that
any conflicting evidence regarding the appropriateness of the scientific
study or its recommendations "was a matter of debate for the
Legislature." 30 o The legislature's directive only needed to bear a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate objective; trial courts do not get to
weigh the merits of a government's selected course of action.3 1 By
rejecting the state's scientific study, the Bogorff trial court declined to
follow established law in reaching its decision.
3. Improper Hindsight Analysis
The Bogorff trial court reached its conclusion that the state's action
was not rational by looking at events transpiring after the adoption of the
eradication program. 3 12 The court claimed DACS could not assert that
citrus canker was a public nuisance because the agency failed to follow the
protocol it delineated in the study.3 13 The notion that an ineffective or
foolish regulation constitutes a taking has been rejected by courts; 314 the
success of a governmental action is not relevant as to whether the action
effects a taking.315 As the Supreme Court remarked in Lingle v. Chevron
USA, Inc.,

an ineffective regulation may not significantly burden
property rights at all, and it may distribute any burden
broadly and evenly among property owners. The notion that
such a regulation nevertheless "takes" private property for

309. See Id. at 786. The Haire district court concluded: "that the trial court erred in
rejecting the legislative choice based on its own view of the scientific evidence and

improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Legislature, which determined that
the 1900-feet (sic) eradication zone was justified by the best available science. .. . We
agree." Id.
310. Id.
311. See id. at 782, 786-87.
312. See In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *30-

31, TT 98-100 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
313.

Seeid.at30, 98.

314. See Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005); Dreher, supra note
97, at 402 (commenting that the ineffectiveness of a regulation is a due process issue
rather than a taking).
315. See Karkkainen, supra note 90, at 828 (claiming that the substantially advances
formula of the Agins court was repudiated by Lingle so that a heightened substantive
due process review has no place in takings jurisprudence); see also Action Apt. Ass'n
v. Santa Monica Rent Control Opinion Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007)
(noting that courts do not second-guess governmental actions to implement
indisputably legitimate goals).
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public use merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness or
foolishness is untenable.' 16
However, an argument that the eradication program was foolish or
unworkable may be evaluated as an issue of substantive due process. 3 17
Due process is a separate issue from takings, and under due process,
Florida's eradication program should have been upheld if there was any
reasonable relationship between the state's actions and any valid
In examining the state's objective, the court
governmental objective.'
inappropriately examined the wisdom of the legislature in choosing the
means to be used and whether the means chosen would in fact accomplish
Instead, the court needed to look at the
the intended goals.3 19
constitutionality of the means chosen. 32 0 By evaluating the merits of the
governmental action rather than burdens imposed on property owners, the
Bogorfif trial court found a taking without a requisite evidentiary
foundation.
B. Labeling the Prevention ofHarm as a Benefit
Considerable controversy exists about whether particular state actions
are intended to prevent harm or confer benefits.32' In Florida, courts have
opined that citrus canker eradication programs confer benefits on the citrus
industry so the destruction of healthy trees resulted in a taking. 32 2 Yet,
efforts to safeguard plants, animals, and humans from plagues, scourges,
316. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
317. See id. at 542 (stating the arbitrariness of a regulation or irrational decision of a
legislative body may run afoul of the Due Process Clause); Dreher, supra note 97, at
405 (observing that the failure of a regulation to accomplish a stated objective would

be considered by a due process inquiry).
318. See Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d 774, 782 (Fla.
2004) (considering the validity of a citrus canker eradication program).
319. See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 15 (Fla. 1974) (discussing how
it is not the role of the court to question the legislative means chosen or their
effectiveness).
320. See id at 15-16.
321. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit
Line in Takings Jurisprudence,6 FORDHAM ENvTL. L. J. 433, 491-521 (1995) (arguing
that the government should compensate persons when there are few adversely affected
by governmental action); Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit " and
"Average Reciprocity of Advantage" Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50
VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1472-1524 (1997) (advocating rules to evaluate the validity of a
government's exercise of its police power).
322. See Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Fla. Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d
101, 103 (Fla. 1988); In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL
8566964, at *23, TT 73-74 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
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and diseases involve governmental action to prevent maladies that are
detrimental to public welfare. By directing actions to prevent or eradicate
diseases, governments act to prevent harm. When DACS took trees and
destroyed them, it did not take the trees for its use or use by the citrus
industry. Rather, the reason for destroying the trees was to confront a
disease that was projected to adversely affect all citrus growers and the
state's economy. The benefits to the citrus industry and all growers
resulted from stopping bacteria from reducing fruit yields that would cause
harm to producers. An analysis of the facts involving the disease and
jurisprudence concerning a harm-benefit dichotomy suggests the Bogorff
trial and appellate court findings are arbitrary and capricious. The courts
miscategorized the evidence of harm as a benefit.
1. Diseases Cause Harm
Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have considered governmental
actions to confront diseases. 3 23 Some courts automatically acknowledge
the ability of a government to take action under their police power to
confront diseases.324 In an Indiana case involving the destruction of a crop
to control the European corn borer, the court found that the state officers
had authority to destroy the plaintiffs crop to protect an important food
supply. 325 The legislative authority applied to the northeastern portion of
the state and did not depend on an actual infestation on an owner's
property. 3 26 The Iowa Supreme Court approved an action by the state of
destroying property without compensation under a statute applying to a
class of plants that served as hosts to black stem rust in wheat.327 While

323. See, e.g., Skinner v. Coy, 90 P.2d 296, 303 (Cal. 1939) (citing cases from other
jurisdictions supporting the destruction of property to prevent the spread of disease);
see also supra note 26.
324. See Wallace v. Feehan, 206 N.E.2d 438, 442 (Ind. 1934) (noting that the validity
of statutory provisions to address a pest attacking plants was not questioned as being
proper under the state's police power); Gray v. Thone, 194 N.W. 961, 963 (Iowa 1923)
(claiming there were too many cases to cite authorizing the destruction of animals
having a disease as an exercise of the police power); Balch v. Glenn, 119 P. 67, 69-70
(Kan. 1911) (observing that the state could classify San Jose scale as a nuisance and
take action under its police power to protect the fruit industry); Kroplin v. Traux, 165
N.E. 498, 501 (Ohio 1929) (observing that "the elimination of disease, whether in
human beings, crops, stock, or cattle, are in general authorized under the police
power."); Stickley v. Givens, 11 S.E.2d 631, 635 (Va. 1940) (noting that the validity of
statutes authorizing the destruction of animals and plants have been sustained as an
exercise of the police power).
325. See Wallace, 206 N.E.2d at 442, 444.
326. See id. at 440.
327. See Gray v. Thone, 194 N.W. 961, 963 (Iowa 1923).
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the destruction of property to control a disease served a public purpose, it
was not devoted to a public use, so it was not a compensable taking.328 As
noted by the Florida Supreme Court, diseases are prevented or eradicated
to prevent harm, and the accompanying destruction of property does not
require compensation.329
The Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
observed that, in general, governments can proscribe harmful uses of
property without the requirement of compensation.3 30 Yet, the elimination
of harm cannot serve as the touchstone to determine whether compensation
is due because many laws and regulations seek to prevent public harm. 33 1
With this limitation, Lucas found that if a regulation preventing harm took
all of the value of the owner's property, there was a compensable
categorical taking. 332 However, the Lucas opinion went further and
commented that the distinction between harm and benefits is "often in the
eye of the beholder."33 3 Under this interpretation of the police power, a
broad range of governmental purposes satisfies the requirement of a
legitimate state interest.3 34
Moreover, in connection with an eminent domain challenge, the
Supreme Court acknowledged in Kelo v. City of New London335 that a
"government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual
private parties."336 As recently noted by the Supreme Court of Delaware, a
project that results in a substantial benefit to private interest may

328. See id. at 963. As further support for the principle that controlling disease does
not take property for a public use, see Balch v. Glenn, 119 P. 67, 69-70 (Kan. 1911);
Colvill v. Fox, 149 P. 496, 499 (Mont. 1915); Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist,
105 S.E. 141, 145 (Va. 1920); cf, Yancy v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1542 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (requiring compensation for the loss in value of a quarantined turkey flock).
329. See Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1957) (finding that the
destruction of diseased trees did not require compensation).
330. See 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992).
331. See id. at 1026. See generally Dreher,supra note 97, at 386-87 (commenting on
the Lucas decision).
332. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-27.
333. Id. at 1024. See generally Huffman, supra note 90, at 5-6 (noting that Lucas
allows governments to confer benefits without incurring takings liability).
334. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023; see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 834-35 (1987) (acknowledging that a broad range of purposes satisfy a legitimate
governmental interest); Martin v. Section 28 Partnership, Ltd., 772 So. 2d 616, 620
(Fla. Ct. App. 2000) (acknowledging that numerous Florida cases illustrate the
principle that a broad range of governmental purposes uphold property regulations).
335. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
336. Id. at 485.
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nevertheless serve a public purpose.3 37 If courts find that "the issue of
private benefit to nearby properties is irrelevant" for eminent domain
proceedings,3 38 a similar standard may apply to inverse condemnation
claims.
Idiosyncrasies of Florida law have led courts to feel that the benefits
of the citrus canker eradication program were mainly for commercial
growers. However, this conclusion does not mean that there was a taking.
In declining to compensate owners of destroyed cedar trees, the Supreme
Court in Miller v. Schoene approved similar benefits for Virginia's apple
growers. 3 39 The Florida Supreme Court observed in Graham v. Estuary
Properties,Inc. that the public may benefit when the state takes action to
prevent harm. 3 40 This suggests that the conclusion by the Bogorff trial
court that DACS's actions constituted a taking had no reasonable
foundation, departed from established law, and was arbitrary and
capricious. In addressing citrus canker, the eradication program addressed
the harm that would occur if citrus canker became established in Florida.
The legislature had a legitimate objective in taking the recommended
action to stop the disease.
2. Ignoring Evidence of Benefits to Noncommercial Growers
Although the eradication of a disease is primarily to prevent harm,
secondary benefits may be identified. The Bogorff trial court found that
"[t]he undisputed evidence demonstrates that the 1900-foot policy was
primarily adopted to protect the commercial citrus industry," 34' and the
appellate court concluded that the trees were not destroyed to prevent harm
but to benefit an industry. 34 2 These conclusions ignored the evidence set
forth by the USDA. 3 4 3 In its assessment of Florida's eradication program,
the USDA observed that the program was "necessary to prevent damage to
commercial and home-grown citrus and further spread of the bacterial

337. See Key Properties Group v. City of Milford, 995 A.2d 147, 152 (Del. 2010)
(concerning condemnation of property to develop sewer service that resulted in

significant benefits for a private developer).
338. See Hoffman Family L.L.C. v. City of Alexandria, 634 S.E.2d 722, 730 (Va.

2006).
339. See 276 U.S. 279 (1928) (making a choice to support apple production at the
expense of owners of cedar trees).
340. See 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla. 1981).
341. In re Citrus Canker Litig., No. 00-18394 (08), 2008 WL 8566964, at *23,

73

(Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2008).
342.

See Dep't. of Agric. and Consumer Servs. v. Bogorff, 35 So. 3d 84, 89 (Fla Dist.

Ct. App. 2010).
343. See USDA Assessment, supra note 40, at 1.
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disease agent." 344 The USDA also pointed out that citrus canker "could
adversely affect homeowners who depend on backyard plantings to
supplement their food supplies." 34 5 Because the disease reduces yields and
fruit quality of infected trees, the eradication of citrus canker would be
beneficial to homeowners. Furthermore, infected trees also may lose their
ornamental value, so that the eradication of citrus canker would benefit
homeowners who valued their trees as part of their landscaping. 3 46 In
adopting legislation to address citrus canker, the Florida legislature also
identified benefits to all citizens of the state due to property and sales taxes
paid by citrus growers and the industry, and the revenues generated
through the marketing and sales of citrus products.3 47
Turning to the Bogorff appellate court's claim of benefits, while
benefits to the industry, citrus growers, and the state's economy offered a
justification for the state's eradication program, the state's actions
specifically involved the elimination of future harm. 3 48 The citrus canker
eradication program offered no funds, direct benefits, or tax breaks to citrus
producers, other than nominal payments for destroyed trees. Instead, the
state's actions sought to prevent citrus canker from spreading and
adversely affecting other owners of citrus trees, including homeowners.
By eliminating the disease, owners of citrus trees, citrus growers, the citrus
industry, and the public would benefit. All of the benefits accruing to the
citrus industry come from the elimination of a disease that harms trees and
adversely affects fruit quality.
Under a distinction between harm versus benefits, state actions to
eradicate diseases are based on the prevention of harm and are exercises of
the state's police power. The Bogorff court chose to ignore the scientific
evidence and established jurisprudence. Under its analysis, preventing a
disease from harming property is a benefit so governments need to pay for
property destroyed in stopping a harmful disease.
V.

REBALANCING RIGHTS

By ignoring general takings rules and declining to analyze
governmental actions under a due process inquiry, the Bogorff decision

344. Id.
345. Id. at 6.
346. See Schubert et al., supra note 33, at 346.
347. See 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 308: "WHEREAS, every citizen in the state benefits
from property taxes, sales taxes, and other revenues generated by the citrus
industry.... Id.
348. See USDA Assessment, supra note 40, at I (observing that eradication was to
prevent damage to citrus).
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invites legislatures and courts to reallocate responsibilities and rebalance
rights to provide greater protection for private property rights. 3 49 Bogorif
may herald a change in the balance of private property rights versus police
power. 35 0 Property rights advocates want governments to pay when
regulatory actions diminish property values. 35 1 With considerable public
support for reducing government regulation, courts and legislatures may
find opportunities to reinterpret takings law to require governments to pay
for property losses due to temporary invasions or significant diminutions of
value. 352
Bogorff's hostility to police power actions corresponds to the
legislative responses to the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of
New London.3 53 Under a state statute that authorized the use of eminent
domain to promote economic development, New London had proposed to
condemn non-blighted properties and lease part of the condemned land to
private parties for office space.354 In affirming the city's actions for its
development project, the Court adopted a broad definition of public
purpose under which community benefits would satisfy the Constitution's
"public use" requirement.3 55 After adopting this low threshold for finding

349. This appears to be counter to the Supreme Court's recent analysis of takings
issues. See Mark Fenster, The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process of
Constitutional Property Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 667, 671 (2007) (analyzing
differences in judicial approaches to takings issues and deferring "to the expert
decisions of other institutions.").
350. See Richard A. Epstein, How to Create-orDestroy-Wealth in Real Property,58
ALA. L. REV. 741, 763 (2007) (observing that a strong system of private rights will
make takings law more coherent).
351. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The EndangeredSpecies Act: A Case
Study in Tankings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 343-44 (1997) (considering
takings under the Endangered Species Act); William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong
Principle,the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1151, 1172 (1997) (advocating a process-based approach to the Takings Clause).
352. See Epstein, supra note 350, at 743-44 (arguing that the expansion of the police
power has weakened property rights).
353. 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005). See generally Steven S. Kaufman, Community
Efforts to Attract andRetain Corporations:Legal and Policy Implications of State and
Local Tax Incentives and Eminent Domain: Regional Economies and the
ConstitutionalImperative of Eminent Domain, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1199 (2008);
Andrew P. Morriss, Supreme Court Economic Review Symposium on Post-Kelo
Reform: Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to Kelo,
17 S. CT. ECON. REV. 237 (2009); Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the
PoliticalResponse to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009).
354. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475-76.
355. Seeid.at484.
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a public use,356 the Kelo Court acknowledged that a state was free to place
"further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power."357
The public and state legislators were not happy with the Kelo
outcome as they felt that it slighted property owners,
and the Court's
359
decision resulted in considerable state legislation.
Forty-six state
legislatures responded within two years of the Kelo decision by considering
bills to restrict eminent domain powers.360 The property rights legislative
proposals disclose actions that can limit governmental interferences and
expand private property rights. However, most of the enacted property
rights laws do not provide much assistance in restricting eminent domain
Because of the inability of the public and legislatures to
powers. 3
implement meaningful public-use limits on eminent domain, the judiciary
may be viewed as offering the best bulwark against overreaching
governmental actions that interfere with property rights.362
The Bogorfif trial and appellate court decisions emulate the legislative
responses to Kelo to curtail governmental actions that interfere with
property rights. The analysis of how the Bogorfif courts reached the
conclusion that DACS's actions effected a taking discloses avenues for
establishing judicial limitations on exercises of police power. After
identifying arguments that offer courts opportunities for giving greater
deference to private property rights, an examination of social costs suggests
that enhancing owners' property rights may not be beneficial. Balancing
property rights with social welfare remains challenging.

356. See James W. Ely, Jr., "PoorRelation" Once More; The Supreme Court and the
Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 64 (arguing that
Kelo eviscerates the public use limitation to allow interest groups to work with local
governments to condemn property for vague public purposes); Richard A. Epstein, The
Public Use, Public Trust & Public Benefit: Could Both Cooley and Kelo Be Wrong?, 9
GREEN BAG 2d 125, 131 (2006) (arguing that Kelo is wrong).
357. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
358. See Kaufman, supra note 353, at 1213-14 (identifying eight categories of state
responses that serve to limit the rights of states to use eminent domain for economic
development and claiming 32 states enacted laws restricting or prohibiting the use of
eminent domain for economic development); Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo 's Legacy:
Eminent Domain and the Future of Property Rights, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 125-29
(discussing the political response to Kelo); llya Somin, Controlling the Grasping
Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo, 15 S. CT. EcoN. REV. 183, 191-92

(2007) (discussing Kelo and dangers of the economic development rationale).
359. See Somin,supra note 353, at 2102.
360. See Morriss, supra note 353, at 239-40 (concluding that forty-two state enacted
legislation or amended their constitutions in response to Kelo).
361. See Somin, supra note 353, at 2103-04 (maintaining "that the majority of the
newly enacted post-Kelo reform laws are likely to be ineffective.").
362. Id. at 2170-71.
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A. Expanding Takings
From time to time, state courts have adopted interpretations of their
state's takings law that digress from federal takings jurisprudence. This
ability of states to have divergent state law is one of the strengths of the
Courts adopt different
nation's federal system of governance. 36 3
interpretations of state takings clauses for reasons of fairness and in
response to policy arguments.364 Several examples show how courts can
expand interference with property rights that effect takings requiring
compensation or expand situations that require payments. A court may
expand the interferences that constitute takings, employ an ad hoc inquiry
with greater deference to damages incurred by property owners advancing
claims of regulatory takings, or use its discretion in its analysis of harm,
nuisances, and emergencies.
1. Recognizing Interferences Requiring Compensation
A few court cases may be highlighted to show how the judiciary
might be more open to finding governmental interferences with property
rights constitute takings. In an Iowa lawsuit, the court unilaterally decided
a nonphysical easement was a de facto taking. An Oregon court expanded
takings to include rights in land. Cases on airport noise highlight the
categorization of interferences as peculiar, special, or not suffered by the
public as a whole to support a finding that a governmental action
constituted a compensable taking.
The Iowa Supreme Court offered more protection under its state
constitution for takings when it considered the application of a state anti-

363. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts
Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1235, 1274 (1999)
(responding to concerns about different outcomes that the federal system was designed
to enable states "to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors.").
364. See, e.g, Stanley Mosk, The Emergence of State Constitutional Law: State
Constitutionalism:Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (1985)
(noting that the Founding Fathers recognized the primacy of the states in protecting
individual rights). However, the most famously quoted statement about the federal
system allowing for different state interpretations of law occurred in the dissent of New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932): "[i]t is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments.") (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 664 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 600 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 58 (1st Cir. 2008); Santa Monica
Beach v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1027 (Cal. 1999) (Baxter, J., dissenting).
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nuisance law. 36 5 Every state has enacted an anti-nuisance law to assist
existing businesses by providing them a defense against allegations of a
nuisance. 3

In an Iowa lawsuit, property owners alleged that an anti-

nuisance law effected a taking even though there were no facts that showed
a physical invasion.367 The Iowa court held that an Iowa anti-nuisance law
created an easement that effected a taking without a physical invasion. 3 68
Even when later confronted with the argument that a second anti-nuisance
law did not involve a physical invasion, the Iowa court defiantly retorted:
Whether the nuisance easement . .. is based on a physical

invasion of particulates from the confinement facilities or
is viewed as a nontrespassory invasion akin to the flying of
aircraft over the land, it is a taking under Iowa's
constitution. 369
Under these Iowa decisions, the Iowa Supreme Court declined to follow
federal jurisprudence on takings and expanded property owners' rights
against governmental actions.370 The Iowa court invalidated the statutory

365. See Bormann v. Kassuth Cnty. Bd. of Sup'rs, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa
1998), cert. denied sub nom. Girres v. Bormann, 119 S. Ct. 1096 (1999) (interpreting
IOWA CODE § 352.11 as effecting a taking); see also Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684
N.W.2d 168, 179 (Iowa 2004) (interpreting the immunity provided by IOWA CODE §
657.11(2) as violating article 1, section I of the Iowa Constitution).
366. See Terence J. Centner, Creating an 'Undeveloped Lands Protection Act' for
Farmlands, Forests, and Natural Areas, 17 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, Appx. 1
(2006) (listing state statutes).
367. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 321.
368. See id at 317. 'To constitute a per se taking, the government need not physically
invade the surface of the land." Id. Terence J. Centner, Anti-Nuisance Legislation:
Can the Derogation of Common Law Nuisance Be a Taking?, 30 ENvTL. L. RPTR.
10253, 10255 (2000) [hereinafter Anti-Nuisance Legislation] (discussing anti-nuisance
statutes that may go too far); Terence J. Centner, Governmental and Unconstitutional
Takings: When Do Right-to-Farm Laws Go Too Far, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87,
117-141 (2006) [hereinafter Takings] (evaluating the constitutionality of an Iowa law
to suggest that the court deviated from federal takings law).
369. Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 173-74 (Iowa 2004).
370. Iowa's interpretation of anti-nuisance laws has not been followed by courts
examining anti-nuisance laws in other states. See Centner, Takings, supra note 368, at
125 (observing that invasions of personal interests in land do not constitute a physical
invasion so are not per se takings); Jeffry R. Gittins, Comment, Bormann Revisited:
Using the Penn Central Test to Determine the Constitutionality of Right-to-Farm
Statutes, 2006 BYU L. REv. 1381, 1396 (2006) (noting that Iowa's Bormann decision
has not been accepted by courts outside of Iowa); Jason Jordan, Comment, A Pig in the
Parlor or Food on the Table: Is Texas's Right to Farm Act an Unconstitutional
Mechanism to Perpetuate Nuisances or Sound Public Policy Ensuring Sustainable
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provision, and because the plaintiffs had not requested compensation, the

court did not determine damages for a temporary taking. 371 The court's
decision precluded the legislature from interfering with property owners'
rights to confront nuisances.
In Oregon, plaintiffs alleged a taking due to the nearby construction
of a major highway that resulted in drainage waters entering the plaintiffs'
properties. 37 2 The supreme court noted that, for the purpose of takings,
property includes "the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to
the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it." 373 By
recognizing that the state had taken plaintiffs' rights in the land rather than
part of the land itself, the court found evidence that supported plaintiffs'
claim of a taking.374 Due to the deposits of mud, dirt, and silt upon
properties owned by the plaintiffs, they were entitled to permanent
damages and the state acquired an easement for drainage waters.37 5 A
subsequent Oregon case summarized Oregon's law of taking to include
governmental acts that "deprive an owner of the useful possession of that
trespasses or by repeated nontrespassory
which he owns, either by repeated
37 6
'nuisance."'
called
invasions
Governmental actions causing interferences that are not suffered by
the public generally may be found to constitute compensable takings.
For example, the adoption of a new zoning ordinance that resulted in a few
properties near an airport suffering substantial declines in property value
may support a finding that the public is receiving an easement for which

compensation must be paid.3 78 Another example involving noise from an
airport suggests that if injury is special and peculiar to nearby property
owners and different in kind from the inconveniences suffered by the

TECH. L. REV. 943, 972 (2010) (evaluating a Texas anti-nuisance law
to conclude it does not result in a unconstitutional physical taking).
371. See Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 321.
372. See Cereghino v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 370 P.2d 694, 698 (Or. 1962); see also
Lincoln Loan Co. v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 545 P.2d 105, 106, 109 (Or. 1976) (finding
plaintiffs had stated facts sufficient to maintain a taking for damages accruing from the
construction of a nearby highway).
373. Cereghino, 370 P.2d at 697 (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)).
374. See id.
375. See id. at 695, 698-99.
376. Lincoln Loan Co. v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 545 P.2d 105, 108 (Or. 1976) (citing
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 106 (1963)).
377. See, e.g., Biddle v. BAA Indianapolis, LLC, 860 N.E.2d 570, 580 (Ind. 2007).
378. See Interstate Cos., v. City of Bloomington, 790 N.W.2d 409, 415 (Minn. 2010),
proceedingsstayedpending rev., 2011 Minn. LEXIS 33 (Minn. Jan. 26, 2011).
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public generally, there may be a taking if property owners cannot make
reasonable uses of their properties.3 79
In other instances, a court may label the government's interference
with the use and enjoyment of property as sufficiently direct, peculiar, and
of a magnitude to support a finding of a compensable invasion. 380 For
example, an invasion of sewage due to a government's action causes
interference so substantial that it supported an inverse condemnation
claim. 38 Alternatively, instead of a physical invasion, the taking of the
right to use and enjoy property may be of such a magnitude that the
property owner alone should not be expected to bear the burden. 3 82
Fairness and justice require that the interference amounts to a taking and
the public pay for it.383
2. Greater Deference to Damages
A second idea for expanding compensatory interferences involves
giving greater deference to damages. Whether this occurs due to a
provision in the state's constitution or a judicial interpretation of a taking, it
may offer additional opportunities for courts to require restitution against
overreaching governmental activities. For Colorado property owners, the
state constitution allows compensation for governmental takings causing
384
In response to an inverse condemnation action, the state
damage.
supreme court ruled that a property owner damaged due to a taking of
adjacent property could recover damages. 8 The court observed that such
a conclusion was to prevent an inequitable result in which the property
"retains more than a de minimis value but, when its diminished economic
value is considered in connection with other factors, the property
effectively has been taken from its owner." 386 However, plaintiffs only

379. See Biddle, 860 N.E.2d at 580 (finding that the plaintiffs retained valuable uses
of their properties so there was no compensable taking); Henthorn v. City of Oklahoma
City, 453 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Okla. 1969) (finding that whether there was substantial
interference with a property owner's use and enjoyment of property was a question for
the trier of facts).
380. See Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, 2011 Ore. App. LEXIS 173, at 15-16 (Or. Ct.
App. Feb. 23, 2011).
381. See Id. at 16.
382. See Sundell v. Town of New London, 409 A.2d 1315, 1318 (N.H. 1979).
383. See id
384. See COLO. CONST. art. 11,§ 15 (2010).
385. See Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of La Plata,
38 P.3d 59, 63-64 (Colo. 2001); see also City of Northglenn v. Grynerg, 846 P.2d 175,
179 (Colo. 1993).
386. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, 38 P.3d at 66.
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3 87
Mere
receive damages if there is unique or special injury to the owner.

diminution in value due to a governmental action is not sufficient to
establish damage under the Colorado provision.
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that the state
constitution has broader language for takings than the U.S. Constitution in
that it requires compensation where private property is taken, destroyed, or
damaged. 39 In considering whether an airport needed to compensate
landowners for navigational easements, the court adopted its own test for
determining which interferences are a taking.
[W]hen those interferences reach the point where they
cause a measurable decrease in property market value, it is
reasonable to assume that, considering the permanency of
the air flights, a property right has been, if not 'taken or
destroyed,' at the very least 'damaged,' for which our
constitution requires that compensation be paid.390
Under this test, property owners need to show a repeated and aggravated
invasion of property rights that results in the deprivation of the practical
enjoyment of property and a definite and measurable diminution of
value. 39 1 Another court noted that, due to the clear intent of Minnesota law
to fully compensate citizens for losses accompanying state action, owners
suffering a substantial and measurable decline in market value must be
compensated.392
Other states' supreme courts have recognized that their just
compensation clauses offer more protection than provided by the Fifth
Amendment. 393 Under state law, consequential injury peculiar to an
owner's land and of a kind not suffered by the public as a whole may be
compensable.3 94 A state compensation clause may intend "to secure to
owners, not only the possession of property, but also those rights which

387. See Grynerg, 846 P.2d at 179.
388. See id
389. See Alevizos v. Metro. Airports Comm'n of Minneapolis & St. Paul, 216
N.W.2d 651, 661 (Minn. 1974).
390. Id. at 662.
391. See id.
392. See Interstate Cos. v. City of Bloomington, 790 N.W.2d 409, 413 (2010).
393. See Varabedian v. City of Madera, 572 P.2d 43, 52 (Cal. 1977); Buhmann v.
Montana, 201 P.3d 70, 88 (Mont. 2008); Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo,
705 N.W.2d 850, 856 (N.D. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1130 (2006); Hall v. South
Dakota, 712 N.W.2d 22, 27 (S.D. 2005).
394. See Hall, 712 N.W.2d at 27.
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Due to interpretations of a state
render possession valuable." 395
compensation clause, governments may need to compensate property
owners for temporary physical invasions. 39 6 These scattered cases disclose
that state courts are able to expand takings jurisprudence beyond what is
recognized under the U.S. Constitution.
3. Declining to Recognize Harm, Nuisances, or Emergencies
Third, a state court might refuse to recognize harm, nuisances, or
emergencies to thereby deprive a government from having a justification
for acting under its police power. As reported in the discussion of harm
from citrus canker, the distinction between harm and benefits is in the eye
of the beholder. 97 Thus, courts have discretion in declining to recognize
harm, thereby supporting a finding that the government's action was a
taking.
Courts also have discretion in determining whether a government's
action is to address a public nuisance.39 8 In Bogorff, the court found that
citrus canker was not a nuisance, therefore the state's action was not
justified and resulted in a taking. A Texas court decided that the question
of whether something is a public nuisance is a judicial question rather than
legislative. 399 Another possibility is for a court to find that a property
owner was consciously singled out or selected to bear a burden which
defendant consciously elected not to impose on others. 400 By placing too

395. Wild Rice River Estates, 705 N.W.2d at 856 (citation omitted) (interpreting N.D.
CONST. art 1, § 16); Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing
Wild Rice River Estates).
396. See Buhmann v. State of Montana, 201 P.3d 70, 88 (Mont. 2008) (interpreting
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29).
397. See supra Part III.B.
398. See Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 867 P.2d 724, 729 (Cal. 1994) (affirming a
trial court's finding that a watercourse was not part of a public improvement so that the

city was not responsible for its water runoff that contributed to flooding); Keshbro, Inc.
v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 876 (Fla. 2001) (observing that the trial court's
finding that a building had become so inextricably intertwined with nuisance drug and
prostitution activity that the city could order its temporary closure without effecting a
taking); Morain v. City of Norman, 863 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Okla. 1993) (observing that
the trial court found that the flooding did not create substantial interference destroying
or impairing the land's usefulness so there was no taking).
399. See Dallas v. Stewart, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 517, at 17 (Tex. 2011) (citing an earlier
case regarding citrus canker).
400. See Argent v. United States, 124 F.3d 1277, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (precluding
summary judgment on a takings argument that allegedly singled out the plaintiff to
bear burdens not imposed on others).
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many burdens on a few, the governmental action is not addressing a public
nuisance so it would be compensable.40 1
Plaintiffs may also allege that the government's action did not address
an emergency and, therefore, the government did not act under its police
power and it needs to pay for the property it damaged or destroyed. In a
case involving the destruction of property at a mobile home park, the
plaintiff introduced evidence that some of the destroyed property was
neither a nuisance nor an emergency.4 02 The court thereby concluded that
the plaintiff had established a case in inverse condemnation.403
In the absence of a viable nuisance, emergency, or other defense, a
government's action that damages property may constitute a taking. Courts
have discretion in determining whether a nuisance or emergency existed
and have some leeway in determining whether governmental actions
require compensation.
B. ExaminingSocial Costs

While augmenting property rights may have considerable appeal to
citizens, legislatures, and courts, a weightier question is what these rights
mean to society. Is it beneficial to require governments to pay for property
rights damaged or destroyed when they take action to control diseases, stop
nuisances, or act to address emergencies? People form governments to
maintain order, delineate rights, and provide for the enforcement of
rights.4 04 In taking action, governments weigh private and public rights to
maximize benefits for the common good, while simultaneously seeking to
enhance private rights enjoyed by individuals.4 05 Under the federal and
state constitutions, Americans have significant rights and freedoms, but the

401. See id. (citing Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 556-57 (1914)).
402. See Gifford v. City of Tampa, 2009 U.S. Dist. 61616, 9 (M.D. Fla. July 20,
2009).
403. See id.at 8-9.
404. See City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1911) (noting that
governments exist to maintain social order and legislatures have discretion in imposing
liability on governments to protect citizens and preserve social order); Sandstorm v.
Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 189 P.2d 17, 20 (Cal. 1948) (recognizing governments' purpose
of maintaining social order and protecting public and individual welfare); Missouri ex
rel. City of Trenton v. Missouri Public Serv. Corp., 174 S.W.2d 871, 876 (Mo. 1943)
(acknowledging that courts settle matters and enforce laws to maintain social order).
405. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON
THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 68 (2007) [hereinafter On Private Property] (questioning
how to define owners' rights to maximize utility); see also Eric Freyfogle, Property
and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 114-15 (2010) [hereinafter Property and
Liberty] (arguing that the most weighty rational for property is to use it to benefit
people in general and not to cause harm).
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rights are not elevated over the collective good. Instead, private rights are
granted to individuals in furtherance of overall social well-being, meaning
406
that individual rights are balanced with the needs of society.
This balance is reflected in historic common law nuisance and
governmental actions in addressing public emergencies.407 However, as
Americans' ideas about the common good shift, rules of property
ownership may shift along with them.408 A state may choose to reexamine
its rights and rebalance conflicting interests. Demographic, economic,
aesthetic, cognitive, and ecological changes may lead legislatures and
courts to alter public and private rights,409 and states may decide to grant
more rights to property owners.410 However, as more rights are granted to
property owners, governments may incur more costs in maintaining public
safety, health, and welfare. Another issue accompanying the rebalancing
of rights is whether the new assignments are beneficial in enhancing total
social welfare.
The police power exists to allow governments to act in the best
interests of citizens as a whole, and the control of contagious diseases has
Property that may transmit
traditionally been found to further this goal .
a disease is considered to be communally harmful, and may be destroyed
without compensation. Under this approach, persons have incentives to
take actions to avoid exposure and prevent infestations. If governments are
required to compensate persons for losses experienced when controlling a
disease, how might this affect individuals and their responses to potential
disease outbreaks?

406. FREYFOGLE, On Private Property, supra note 405, at 113-14 (observing that
from a moral point of view, persons should not be able to do things that harm their
communities).
407. See Guimont v. Clarke, 854 P.2d 1, 8 (Wash. 1993) (noting that if background
principles of nuisance and property law prohibit a viable use of property, a government
proscription of the use is not compensable); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. California, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (noting emergencies justifying the use of the police
power); Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 909 (Cal. 1995) (observing
that if a governmental acts under an emergency justified by the police power, the
resulting loss does not matter as it is not compensable).
408. See Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, supra note 405, at 78 (noting that private
nuisance was historically a source of property but more recently is viewed by some as a
restraint on property rights).
409. See FREYFOGLE, On Private Property, supra note 405, at xxi (noting changes
that may lead to property conflicts).
410. See Hart, Land Use Law, supra note 19, at 1154 (noting that federalism was to
enable states to have choices in awarding damages for governmental actions).
411. See Santiago Legarre, The HistoricalBackground of the Police Power, 9 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 745, 794 (2007) (commenting on the historical use of the police power to
promote public health and safety).
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From an efficiency viewpoint, disease-control efforts should place
responsibilities on persons best able to take actions to avoid exposure and
eliminate the disease. 412 For most diseases, this involves persons or
property owners who would suffer losses if they or their properties became
413
diseased. Governments can also play a role in preventing disease.
When governments employ nuisance law or take emergency action to
confront a disease without compensating persons experiencing property
losses, people have an incentive to take preventive actions to minimize
Individuals recognize that they lose if a disease becomes
losses.
established, so they use care to prevent it. 4 14 However, if property owners
are paid for the diminished value of properties adversely affected by a
disease, as was ordered by the Bogorff court, the incentive to take
preventive action is removed.4 15 This introduces a moral hazard problem;
property owners lack appropriate incentives to take preventive measures to
preclude the introduction of diseases.4 16
When governments must pay for property damaged in controlling
diseases, the requirement represents an implicit insurance policy for
producers without any risk classification or incentive to make investments
in disease control.4 17 Although insureds may be able to take actions to

412. See M.G. Ceddia, J. Heikkila & J. Peltola, Managing Invasive Alien Species
with Professionaland Hobby Farmers:Insights from Ecological-Economic Modelling,
68 ECOL. ECON. 1366, 1367 (2009) (noting the difference between producers without
an incentive to take preventive measures to address a disease and those that do).
413. See Beach, Poulos, & Pattanayak, supra note 29, at 472 (discussing public and
private efforts to prevent disease damages).
414. This may not be true for noncommercial producers because production has little
economic importance for them so they lack meaningful financial incentives to carry out
effective disease-prevention measures. See Ceddia, Heikkila, & Peltola, supra note
412, at 1367.
415. See Beach, Poulos, & Pattanayak, supra note 29, at 481 (reporting that
compensation payments to owners losing birds under a program to control avian
influenza tends to reduce optimal preventive investment).
416. See Goodwin & Piggott, supra note 52, at 1043 (noting that insureds exercise
less care and prevention when insurance payments are available). See also Terence J.
Centner and Susana Ferreira, Controlling Diseases and Nuisances: Time-Based Rights
and AgriculturalProduction, 29 LAND USE POL'Y 513, 519 (2012) (arguing that the
requirement to compensate property owners for property in exposure zones may
remove incentives to invest in disease-control activities to thereby detract from total
social welfare).
417. See Benjamin M. Gramig, Richard D. Horan & Christopher A. Wolf, Livestock
Disease Indemnity Design When Moral Hazard Is Followed by Adverse Selection, 91
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 627 (2009) (noting problems that accompany payouts that are not
related to risk and preventive measures); Goodwin & Piggott, supra note 52, at 1039
(discussing the development of insurance products to deal with situations where it is
difficult to observe disease prevention measures by producers).
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prevent diseases or minimize losses, under an insurance program offering
guaranteed payouts, insureds have little incentive to invest in these
actions. 4 18 The expected result is less success at preventing disease, greater
probabilities that the disease will spread, and higher costs of disease
control. 4 19 Thus, the Bogorfif decision eliminates incentives to control
disease, increases the probability that a disease will become established,
and increases the costs that society must bear managing established
diseases. In Florida, this has resulted in a citrus canker epidemic sweeping
through the citrus production areas of the state, and corresponding disease
management programs introducing copper into the environment. 4 20 if
recognizing private property rights leads to the establishment of a disease,
the overall result is probably a loss in social welfare.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Bogorfif decision offers courts arguments for limiting police
power actions by reinterpreting state constitutional mandates. To augment
private property rights, governments may be required to compensate
persons for more actions that denigrate rights. Courts also may expand the
definition of a taking to include more actions and situations where rights
are damaged. Under either of the scenarios, governments might be saddled
with more expenditures necessary to control diseases or provide for public
welfare. Alternatively, governments might engage in fewer actions to
protect the public, including actions to safeguard public health and safety
and public works projects that temporarily involve trespasses on private
property. Due to reinterpretations of the police power and takings,
governments would reduce their actions to avoid expenditures required to
compensate owners for property damaged or destroyed.
An analysis of the trial and appellate court decisions in Bogorfif shows
how courts can readjust property rights. The courts failed to differentiate
between permanent occupations and temporary invasions to find that a one-

418. See Goodwin & Piggott, supra note 52, at 1039-40 (identifying moral hazard);
Beach, Poulos, & Pattanayak, supra note 29, at 474 (noting that producers may choose
"to free-ride on the disease control efforts of other[s]").
419. See Beach, Poulos, & Pattanayak, supra note 29, at 481 (reporting that
governments might not pay compensation if such would displace private disease
control measures); S. Sartore et al., The Effects of Control Measures on the Economic
Burden Associated with Epidemics of Avian Influenza in Italy, 89 POULTRY SC. 1115,
1121 (2010) (arguing that proactive preventive measures is financially superior to
reactive approaches to cure a problem).
420. See Behlau et al., supra note 53, at 305 (advocating applying copper sprays
every 21-28 days for economical control of citrus canker); Dewdney & Graham, supra
note 53, at 4 (recommending five copper sprays applied at 21-day intervals).
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time invasion of property to eradicate a disease was a de facto taking. The

courts analyzed the legitimacy of the state's eradication program and the

legislative declaration of a nuisance by weighing evidence under a takings
analysis rather than employing a substantive due process inquiry. The
Bogorff trial court ignored evidence showing the failure to eradicate citrus
canker would harm homeowner citrus producers and the state's economy.
Instead, the trial and appellate courts decided that the government should
pay for property destroyed in actions to eradicate a serious plant disease.
While the analysis of the courts' decisions suggests the courts failed to
follow established Florida jurisprudence and arbitrarily decided that
DACS's actions constituted a compensable taking, appeals have been
unsuccessful; the district court's ruling constitutes case law that may be
followed by other courts.
However, despite the possible lapses in complying with established
jurisprudence, the real damage of the district court's holding is that it
detracts from social welfare. By finding that a state's just compensation
clause overrides the police power under which public nuisances and
emergencies may be addressed without compensation, the decision may be
expected to raise the costs of agricultural production and other
governmental actions to detract from overall social welfare. By installing a
property rights system that guarantees citrus producers payments for
damaged property interests, the appellate court's decision eliminates
producers' incentives to take preventive measures to control citrus canker.
Absent effective disease prevention, more diseases will become established
resulting in more expensive agricultural production with associated costs.
Similar results may occur in the land use context if governments
cannot take actions to address nuisance situations without paying for
If governments must pay for actions
ancillary property damages.
denigrating property rights, the costs will limit their governance with a
corresponding loss of communal benefits. 42 1 Although courts are intended
to be the final arbitrator in takings cases, constitutional protections against
takings were not intended to grant courts carte blanche to override the
police power. As set forth by the Founding Fathers in the Preamble to the
Constitution, "We the People of the United States, in Order to .. . promote
the general Welfare, . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution. . . ."

Governments exist to promote general welfare: 4 2 2 courts should be hesitant
421. For example, governmental redevelopment projects often lead to beneficial
property reallocations and foster innovative projects designed to promote economic
growth. See Mahoney, supra note 358, at 127 (noting limitations from prohibiting
condemnations for economic development).
422. Moreover, property law should protect liberty to the extent that liberty promotes
the common good. Freyfogle, PropertyandLiberty, supra note 405, at 117.
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to reject established jurisprudence if the result will be the antithesis of the
people's welfare. By expanding private property rights, the Bogorff
decision places additional costs on governments and detracts from overall
social welfare.

